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INTRODUCTION
The goal of this comment—the twelfth in a series of efforts to
summarize recent developments in the field of labor law'—is to assist
* The authors wish to express their appreciation to Professor Richard S. Sullivan
of the Boston College Law School for helpful comments on a number of cases discussed
here. The criticisms which appear in this Survey do not, of course, necessarily reflect the
opinions of Professor Sullivan.
1 The previous comments are: 1971-1972 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law,
13 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1347 (1972); 1970-1971 Annual Survey of Labor Relations
Law, 12 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1026 (1971); 1969-1970 Annual Survey of Labor
Relations Law, 11 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 916 (1970); 1968-1969 Annual Survey of
Labor Relations Law, 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 785 (1969); Recent Decisions on
Jurisdictional Problems, 9 B.C. lnd. & Corn. L. Rev. 1059 (1968); 1966-1967 Annual
Survey of Labor Relations Law, 8 B.C. Ind. & Corn, L. Rev. 771 (1967); 1965-1966
Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 7 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 909 (1966); 1964-
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practitioners to keep abreast of changes in the law which occurred
during the twelve months ending on March 31, 1973. Significant deci-
sions of the National Labor Relations Board and the courts are re-
ported in the greatest depth possible in a work of this nature.
Especially noteworthy during the Survey year were the NLRB's
development of its Collyer doctrine,2
 and the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in the areas of successorship, 2
 solicitation/distribution rules,' and
union discipline. 8
I. NLRB EXPANSION OF THE Collyer DOCTRINE
In a 1971 case, Collyer Insulated Wire,' the National Labor Re-
lations Board announced a new policy of deference to contractual
grievance and arbitration procedures when it held that it would defer
to arbitration because the dispute was essentially over the meaning of
the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Prior to Collyer it was the
Board's practice to honor existing arbitral awards if they met the
standards set out in the Spielberg2
 case; that is, the Board would
defer to an award when it appeared that the proceedings were fair
and regular, that all parties had agreed to be bound and that the re-
sult was not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the Act).8 In Collyer, the
Board retained jurisdiction over the dispute to insure compliance with
these criteria, indicating that this test would also define the scope of
Board review of arbitral awards resulting from Collyer type deferral.
Collyer represented an attempt by the Board to effectuate the
national labor policy expressed in section 203(d) of the Act to en-
courage the voluntary settlement of industrial disputes. The facts of
that case were narrow, however, involving an alleged violation based
on unilateral conduct which the employer reasonably asserted was
sanctioned by the bargaining agreement. In a memorandum contain-
ing guidelines for the application of Collyer, the General Counsel of
the NLRB indicated that deferral should be confined to such facts.4
1965 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 6 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 815 (1965);
Recent Developments in Labor Law, 5 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 629 (1964); Recent
Developments in Labor Law, 4 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 661 (1963); Labor's New
Frontier, The End of the Per Se Rules, 3 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 487 (1962).
2 See pp. 1174-81 infra.
3 Sec pp. 1209-16 infra.
4 See pp. 1217-21 infra.
5 Sec pp. 1224-27 infra.
1
 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
2
 Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955).
a Id. at 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
4
 Peter G. Nash, Memorandum: Arbitration Deferral Policy under Collyer 14-15
(Feb. 28, 1972).
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However, the Board's candid assertion that Collyer represented a
"developmental step" in its treatment of the problem of dual juris-
diction°—that of the Board to hear and determine unfair labor prac-
tice issues and that of the arbitrator to remedy contract violations—
together with the retirement of Member Brown, one of a bare majority
joining in the Collyer decision, provoked much speculation about the
future of the Collyer doctrine .°
During the Survey year the Board substantially extended and
refined the Collyer doctrine. In a landmark case, National Radio Co., 7
the Board applied its deferral policy to a section 8(a) (3) 8 charge and
declared that the "crucial determinant" of deferral was the reason-
ableness of the assumption that the contractual arbitration procedure
would resolve the dispute in a manner consistent with the Spielberg
criteria.° The union in that case charged that the employer had vio-
lated section 8(a) (5)" of the Act by unilaterally imposing a require-
ment that union representatives record and report their movements
in the plant while processing grievances on company time. It was also
charged that the employer had violated section 8(a) (3) by disciplin-
ing and subsequently discharging an employee who failed to comply
with these requirements. The employer argued that the adoption of
the plant movement reporting requirement was sanctioned by the con-
tract and, therefore, that the employee had been disciplined for just
cause in accordance with the contract. An additional section 8(a) (3)
° 77 L.R.R.M. at 1938.
0 See 1971-1972 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 13 B.C. In & Corn, L. Rev.
1347, 1376-81 (1972); Anderson, NLRB and Private Arbitration; Should Collyer Be
Extended to Employee Discipline Cases?, 13 B.C. Ind, & Com. L. Rev. 1460 (1972).
7 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718 (1972). Members Fanning and Jenkins dis-
sented, as they did in Collyer. In their view the Board is precluded from withholding its
unfair labor practice procedures from the disputants in these and like cases by § 10(a)
of the NLRA, which provides that the Board's power to prevent unfair labor practices
"shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may
be established by agreement, law, or otherwise." 29 U.S.C, § 160(a) (1970). See 77
L.R.R.M. at 1943 (dissenting opinion); 80 L.R.R.M. at 1724 (dissenting opinion). Fur-
thermore they protested the expansion of Collyer, in National Radio, to cases which in-
volved individual rights and which did not call upon the arbitrator's special competence
in interpreting the contract. 80 L.R.R.M. at 1724-25 (dissenting opinion).
The appellate courts, however, have consistently enforced decisions in which the Board
has relied upon section 10(a) as establishing a discretionary right to exercise jurisdiction.
See Anderson, Concurrent Jurisdiction—NLRB and Private Arbitration: A Pragmatic
Analysis, 12 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 179, 181 (1970). Furthermore, the Supreme Court,
in Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 271 (1964), cited with approval
language of the Board to the effect that it has considerable discretion in exercising its
jurisdiction.8 29	 § 158(a)(3) (1970) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
discriminate on the basis of union membership.
9 80 L.R.R.M. at 1723.
10 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees.
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•charge rested upon the employer's suspension of the same employee,
an active union member, for destroying a list containing the names
of employees who had manufactured defective parts. The administra-
tive law judge rejected the employer's request to stay the unfair labor
practice proceedings pending the outcome of arbitration proceedings
already invoked, and found that the employer had violated section
8(a) (5) and (3) of that Act."
The Board viewed the section 8(a) (5) charge as identical to
that presented in Collyer in that it involved a dispute over the mean-
ing of a contractual provision. The issue was distinguishable from
that presented in Collyer, however, on the basis of the allegation, in
National Radio, that the employer was motivated by union animus
in disciplining the employee for failure to comply with the plant move-
ment requirement. The import of this distinction lies in the fact that
although in Collyer resolution of the contract dispute would resolve
the unfair labor practice issue, there was a possibility in National
Radio that the conduct in question was sanctioned by the contract
but prohibited by the, Act because effected with a discriminatory mo-
tive. The Bbard recognized that this possibility necessitated caution
in declining to assert jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it held that the issues
presented by the employer's adoption of the plant movement procedure
and discipline of the employee for failure to comply with it should
not be considered by it in advance of an authoritative determination
of the contractual issues by the arbitrator. 12
The Board next considered the allegation that the employer vio-
lated section 8(a) (3) when it suspended the same employee for
destroying the list. The issue presented by this charge differed signifi-
cantly from that presented in Collyer because the basis urged for
deferral was not the arbitrator's special skill and expertise in interpret-
ing the provisions of the bargaining contract. Rather, deference was
urged on the broad ground that the contract prohibited discipline for
other than just cause and provided a method for vindicating employee
rights when the clause was violated. The Board stated, nevertheless,
that the fundamental considerations—an alleged wrong remediable in
both a statutory and a contractual forum and the necessity for a ra-
tional accomodation of the Board's duty to foster the collective bar-
gaining process with its duty to prevent unfair labor practices—were
the same as in Collyer." Holding that deference was appropriate in
National Radio and similar cases because it was reasonable to assume
that the arbitration procedure would operate to resolve the dispute
11 80 L.R.R.M. at 1718-19.
12 Id. at 1721.
13 Id. at 1722.
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fully and in a manner consistent with the Spielberg standards, the
Board withheld its unfair labor practice processes. It retained juris-
diction, as in Collyer, to insure compliance with the Spielberg stan-
dards.14
National Radio represents a major expansion of the Board's de-
ferral policy. It extends Collyer to section 8(a) (3) cases and does
away with the requirements that the dispute be essentially over the
substantive meaning of a contract term and that a reasonable con-
struction of the contract preclude a finding that the conduct in ques-
tion violated the Act. The rationale behind Collyer—that of promoting
private resolution of industrial disputes by the Board's declining to
exercise its jurisdiction when arbitration is available—has become the
foundation of the Board's deferral policy. In place of the guidelines
supplied by the facts of Collyer, the Board has declared that the
"crucial determinant" in every case is the reasonableness of the as-
sumption that the arbitration process will fully resolve the underlying
dispute in a manner consistent with Spielberg." In support of its con-
clusion that the foregoing assumption was reasonable in National
Radio, the Board noted three factors: (1) the substantial harmony
of interest between the employee and his representative; (2) the long
and productive bargaining relationship between the parties; and (3)
the absence of a history of union animus or a pattern of action sub-
versive of section 7 rights.'° In subsequent Survey year cases the
Board has considered these and other factors in a case-by-case deter-
mination of the reasonableness of the probability that arbitration will
fully resolve the dispute in a manner consistent with Spielberg.
Substantial harmony of interest between the employee and his
representative is a controlling factor in the determination of whether
deference is appropriate. In Kansas Meat Packers Union," the Board
refused to defer a section 8(a) (3) charge to arbitration because there
was an apparent conflict between the interests of the employees on
one hand, and the interests of both the employer and the union on the
other. The dispute arose out of the discipline and subsequent discharge
of two employees who were aggressive in pressing grievances against
both the employer and the union. The discharges occurred shortly
after both employees submitted written revocations of their dues check-
off authorizations. In refusing to defer, the Board emphasized two
factors: (1) the antagonism between the discriminatees and both
parties to the collective bargaining agreement; and (2) the discrimi-
14 Id. at 1723-24.
15 Id. at 1723.
10 Id. at 1723-24.
17 198 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 80 L.R.R.M. 1743 (1972).
1177
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
natees' resultant election to refrain from seeking redress through the
contractual grievance procedures. 18
 The significance of the first factor
was recognized by the Board in National Radio when it attributed the
reasonableness of its assumption that arbitration would resolve the
dispute in a manner consistent with Spielberg in part to the likeli-
hood that a substantial harmony of interest between the employee and
his representative would obtain in every such case." However, it is
submitted that although the second factor emphasized by the Board
may constitute a circumstance supporting a refusal to defer, its ab-
sence could not be determinative since an award rendered in an arbitral
proceeding wherein all of the arbitrators are likely to be predisposed
against the grievant does not satisfy the Spielberg criterion of a fair
and regular proceedine and, therefore, deferral would be inappro-
priate under National Radio even if the grievants had invoked con-
tractual grievance procedures in addition to the Board's unfair labor
practice procedures.
In another Survey year case the Board refused to defer to contrac-
tual grievance procedures where overriding considerations of federal
policy militated against deferral. In Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons, Inc.,21
it was alleged that the employer violated section 8(a)(1)" by threat-
ening an employee who was a union official with reprisal for participa-
tion in grievance procedures. The Board held that deference was
inappropriate, distinguishing National Radio on two grounds: (1) it
did not appear that the conduct which was the subject of the charge
in Ryerson, an asserted threat unaccompanied by other discipline or
a change in employment status, could form the basis of a grievance
cognizable under the contract; and (2) there was no showing of the
authority of the arbitrator under the contract to remedy company
interference with the performance of grievance functions by a grievance
committeeman. 23 Recognizing that it was departing from the normal
practice of leaving issues of arbitrability for resolution by the arbitra-
tor, the Board characterized the charge in question as one which
"strikes at the foundation of that grievance and arbitration mechanism
upon which we have relied in the formulation of our Collyer doc-
trine."24 Other Survey year cases in which the Board held that de-
ference was appropriate where the dispute was arguably cognizable
18 80 L.R.R.M. at 1746.
10 80 L.R.R.M. at 1723-24.
20 Youngstown Cartage Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 305, 308 n.4, 55 L.R.R.M. 1301, 1305
(1964); Roadway Express, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 513, 514-15, 54 L.R.R.M. 1419, 1421 (1963).
21 199 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 81 L.R.R.M. 1261 (1972).
22 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1970) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
interfere with his employees in the exercise of § 7 rights.
23 81 L.R.R.M. at 1263.
24 Id. at 1263-64.
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under the contract' indicate that this latter factor—the tendency of
the conduct in question to frustrate the grievance procedure—was con-
trolling in Ryerson. Ryerson thus indicates that the reasonable prob-
ability test of National Radio requires that deference be refused in
any case in which it appears that a party sought to impede utilization
of the contractual grievance process.
In Ryerson the Board, making explicit a requirement which would
appear to be implicit in the National Radio test of reasonable prob-
ability of consistency with Spielberg, explained that it would not ab-
stain from exercising its jurisdiction unless the alternate procedures
were "open, in fact, for use by the disputants" as well as fair and
regular." Thus, the Board will not defer to arbitration unless it ap-
pears either that the issue raised by the unfair labor practice charge
will be determined in the arbitration proceeding or that it is likely
that resolution of the issues subject to arbitration will dispose of the
underlying basis of the unfair labor practice charge, rendering a Board
proceeding unnecessary. In George Koch Sons, Inc., 27
 a panel of the
Board refused to defer a charge that a union had violated section
8(b) (1) (B) 28 of the Act by fining an alleged supervisor for violating
union rules. The Board held that it was compelled to take jurisdiction
to determine whether the fine was violative of the Act since that issue
would not be determined in an arbitral proceeding.29 In National Bis-
cuit Co.," however, the Board deferred a charge that the union had
violated section 8(b)(1) (A)" of the Act by fining a member even
though that charge was not subject to an agreement to arbitrate, since
it appeared that the validity of the charge was dependent upon a find-
ing that the union had violated the contract. The Board retained juris-
diction and indicated that if the arbitrator were to find that the union
had violated the contract, it would, on request and in its discretion,
determine the 8(b) ( 1) (A) allegation."
In Koch a charge that the union had also violated section 8 (b) (1)
(B) by striking to compel the employer to make payments of benefits
and wages to the same employee in accordance with contract provisions
21 Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 80 L.R.R.M. 1711 (1972); Urban
N. Patman, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 80 L.R.R.M. 1481 (1972).
28 81 L.R.R.M. at 1264.
27 Sheet Metal Workers Local 17 (George Koch Sons, Inc.), 199 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 81
L.R.R.M. 1195 (1972).
28 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1970) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to
restrain or coerce an employer in the selection of his representatives.
29 81 L.R.R.M. at 1198.
80 Teamsters Local 70 (National Biscuit Co.), 198 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 80 L.R.R.M. 1727
(1972).
81 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1970) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union
to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of § 7 rights.
82 80 L.R.R.M. at 1730 n.8.
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covering "foremen" was not deferred, because it did not appear that
the arbitrator in determining the contract issue of whether the em-
ployee was covered by the contract clause would consider the statutory
issue of whether the employee was a supervisor within the definition
of the Act. In noting that there was less reason to defer the 8(b)
(1) (B) issue because the Board was required to determine a part of
the dispute—the propriety of the fine—the Board seemed to imply that
had the rest of the dispute been arbitrable, it would have deferred
consideration of the 8(b) (1) (B) issue also." In such a case then, it
appears that the Board may find that there is a reasonable probability
that the dispute will be fully resolved through arbitration and follow
the procedure set out in National Biscuit.
The General Counsel of the NLRB has issued a memorandum
revising the guidelines for the application of Collyer." He has indi-
cated that a prima facie warrant for the deferral of a dispute is es-
tablished by the existence of a contract between the parties which
makes binding arbitration encompassing the dispute available to the
charging party, provided that the dispute does not concern a special
subject matter inappropriate for deferral." Subject matters not ap-
propriate for deferral include disputes over accretion issues, over
requests for information relevant to contract negotiation or to the pro-
cessing of grievances, and over union recognition." The General Coun-
sel has also directed the Regional Offices not to defer charges unless
the respondent is willing to submit all aspects of the underlying dispute
to arbitration.37
The extent to which the Collyer doctrine will be successful in
go 81 L.R.R.M. at 1198.
24 Peter G. Nash, Memorandum: Arbitration Deferral Policy under Collyer—Revised
Guidelines (May 10, 1973).
35
 Id. at 37.
86 Id. at 19-25. The General Counsel has also indicated that deferral is not appro-
priate where the contract provisions conflict with the provisions of the statute. Id. at 25.
However, in Koch, discussed in text at note 27 supra, upon which the General Counsel
relies, the Board does not mention that consideration as a factor in its refusal to defer.
Furthermore, in Ryerson, discussed in text at note 21 supra, the Board, in spite of the
probability that an award pursuant to such a contract term would be repugnant to the
Act, suggested that the question of deference predicated on such a provision remains open.
81 L.R.R.M. at 1262 n.l.
57 Id. at 15. In Medical Manors, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 81 L.R.R.M. 1341 (1972),
the Board deferred to arbitration even though the employer had engaged in unwarranted
"foot dragging" in complying with the contractual grievance procedures. The Board ex-
pressed some reluctance, but, noting that the employer was under a court order compelling
him to proceed to arbitration, deferred and retained jurisdiction against the contingency of
further delay by the employer. 81 L.R.R.M. at 1343 n.2.
This case indicates that willingness on the part of a respondent is not a sine qua non
of deferral, but a factor to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the prob-
ability that arbitration will operate so as to obviate the need for further action by the
Board.
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achieving the national labor policy goal of promoting the voluntary
settlement of industrial disputes through private contractual proce-
dures is not known. The Board's new deferral policy has been described
by Chairman Miller as an experiment to see if labor disputes can be
resolved without government intervention." The expansion of Collyer
during the Survey year to facts such as those presented in National
Radio would appear to be required, then, if the results of this experi-
ment are to be valid. The Board's past practice of encouraging parties
to resort to contractual grievance and arbitration procedures while
refusing on its own part to entrust disputes to these very processes
was not calculated to promote the national goal of industrial self-
government.
II. BOARD AND COURT DEVELOPMENT OF
ARBITRATION POLICY
A. Jurisdiction of the Arbitrator: Flair
During the Survey year, in Operating Engineers Local 150 v. Flair
Builders, Inc.,' the Supreme Court, with two members dissenting, held
that a broad arbitration clause, in which the parties had agreed to arbi-
trate "any difference," required that the issue of laches be submitted to
the arbitrator for decision. The dispute in Flair arose out of a memo-
randum agreement signed by the parties in 1964 in which the company
agreed to be bound by any future master agreement between the union
and local contractor associations. In 1966, the union and the contractor
associations entered into a new master agreement which provided that
"any difference" between the parties not settled within forty-eight hours
would be submitted to arbitration. In 1968, the union, on its first visit
to Flair since the signing of the memorandum, complained about Flair's
wages and about the fact that Flair's four employees were non-union.
Flair refused to recognize any obligation to the union and the union sued
for specific performance. The district court held that Flair was bound
by the memorandum agreement to arbitrate disputes in accordance with
the arbitration clause of the master agreement, but, relying on the four-
year absence of contact between the union and Flair, the court found
that the union was guilty of laches and dismissed the action. 2
On appeal, the union argued' that the question of whether its de-
lay in notifying the company of the existence of a dispute should operate
88
 Address by Edward B. Miller, Georgia Bar Association, May 4, 1973.
1 406 U.S. 487 (1972).
2 This statement of facts is drawn from the dissenting opinion, id. at 492-94. The dis-
trict court opinions are unreported.
a 440 F.2d 557, 559, 76 L.R.R.M. 2595, 2597 (7th Cir. 1971).
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to bar its suit to compel arbitration was a question of "procedural timeli-
ness" which the courts were required to leave to an arbitrator's deter-
mination pursuant to John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 4 in which
the Supreme Court had held that procedural questions growing out of an
arbitrable dispute and bearing on its final disposition should be left to
the arbitrator. Affirming by a divided vote, the Seventh Circuit dis-
tinguished Wiley on the ground that it determined only that questions
of intrinsic untimeliness—those relating to whether the procedural pre-
requisites to arbitration dictated by the contract had been followed—
should be submitted to the arbitration. The instant case, on the other
hand, raised a question of extrinsic untimeliness, which was not based
on a violation of contract procedure and which could, therefore, properly
be determined by a court.'
On certiorari, the union contended that even if the parties had not
agreed to arbitrate the laches issue, Wiley required that it be submitted
to the arbitrator for decision because it involved a determination of the
merits of the dispute and bore directly on its outcome.° The Supreme
Court, however, did not reach that question, holding that the parties
by agreeing to arbitrate "any difference" and by not excepting any dis-
putes or class of disputes from arbitration had, in fact, agreed to arbi-
trate the issue of laches. 7 The Court reasoned that the words "any
dispute" must be given their plain meaning.
In dissent, Justice Powell disagreed with the majority's interpreta-
tion of the words which, in his view, referred only to issues concerned
with terms and conditions of employment. Justice Powell further pro-
tested that the essence of the defense of laches is that the union was
precluded from enforcing "any and all provisions of the contract, includ-
ing the arbitration clause."' He evidenced concern that under the hold-
ing of the Court a general arbitration clause displaced the jurisdiction of
the courts to determine affirmative defenses raised against the enforce-
ability of contracts.' The Court's holding, however, is confined to cases
where laches is raised as a defense to the arbitrability of particular
grievances.'" The Court cautioned that its holding did not affect the
responsibility of the judiciary to determine whether parties are subject
to an agreement to arbitrate and the scope of that agreement." Thus,
the Court indicated that affirmative defenses raised against the en-
4 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
5 440 F.2d at 560, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2598.
0 406 U.S. at 490-91.
7 Id. at 491.
8 Id. at 495 (dissenting opinion).
9 Id. at 497 (dissenting opinion).
10 Id. at 491-92.
11 Id. at 491.
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forceability of the bargaining agreement or of the arbitration clause are
to be decided by courts.
The Court's holding is consonant with the nature of section 301
suits" as well as with the national labor policy favoring arbitration of
labor disputes. Suits under section 301 are suits to enforce contracts,
and the role of the judiciary must be confined to determining whether
a legally enforceable promise exists and the scope of that promise. Con-
ventional arbitration clauses providing that disputes about the meaning
or application of the contract are to be submitted to arbitration are
excluded from the Court's holding in Flair. In determining arbitrability
under these clauses, which confine the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to
the boundaries of the contract, the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction made
by the Seventh Circuit in Flair, and which the Supreme Court found
irrelevant, could constitute a valid test of arbitrability.
B. Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Malrite
In a Survey year case, Malrite of Wisconsin, Inc.," the Board
clarified its position with regard to the enforcement of arbitral awards
when it deferred to an award even though the employer refused to com-
ply with it. The Board, with two members dissenting, asserted that when
an award meets all of the Spielberg standards," noncompliance with the
award should not be a matter of Board concern.'°
The dispute in Malrite centered on a provision of the bargaining
agreement which restricted the use of a job classification combining the
separate duties of engineers and announcers. When the employer, with-
out bargaining, expanded the scheduling of engineer-announcers, the
controversy was submitted to arbitration in accordance with the con-
tract. The arbitrator determined that the employer had violated the
bargaining agreement. When the employer failed to comply with the
arbitral award by reinstituting separate engineer and announcer classi-
fications, the union filed a charge alleging that the employer had violated
section 8(a) (5) by unilaterally changing the scheduling of the em-
ployees in question.1°
The Board, in explanation of its refusal to act, stated:
In its formulation of the Spielberg standards the Board
12 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970) provides in part: "Suits for violation of contracts be-
tween an employer and a labor organization • . • may be brought in any district
court . . . .0
13 198 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 80 L.R.R.M. 1593 (1972).
14 In Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955), the Board
held that it will defer to an arbitration award if the proceedings appear to have been
fair and regular and the award is not repugnant to the Act.
15 80 L.R.R.M. at 1594.
10
 Id. at 1593-94.
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did not contemplate its assumption of the functions of a tribu-
nal for the determination of arbitration appeals and the en-
forcement of arbitration awards. If the Board's deference to
arbitration is to be meaningful it must encompass the entire
arbitration process, including the enforcement of arbitral
awards.17
The Board concluded that the objective of encouraging voluntary set-
tlement of disputes would best be served by requiring the parties to
proceed to the usual conclusion of the arbitral process—judicial
enforcement—and dismissed the complaint. The Board felt that immedi-
ate access to the courts should be preferred over the long administrative
route, and announced that this was the course it was "encouraging these
and future disputants to follow.""
The result in Malrite seems to be required by the nature of proceed-
ings to enforce arbitral awards. They are, in essence, suits to enforce the
terms of a collective bargaining contract, and section 301 of the NLRA'°
provides for the bringing of such suits in the courts. Furthermore, the
Board correctly recognizes that the result in this case is mandated if its
policy of deference to arbitration is to be effective. Otherwise, a party
dissatisfied with an arbitral award could secure Board relitigation of
the claim simply by refusing to comply with the award.
C. Effect of Grievance and Arbitration Awards
on Title VII Actions: Riog
In an innovative decision, the Fifth Circuit in Rios v. Reynolds
Metals Co. 2° has adopted a policy of conditional deferral to arbitration
awards covering conduct which is also made the basis of a Title VII
suit.2' The facts in that case present a classic example of the problem
raised by the overlapping jurisdiction of the arbitrator under collective
bargaining agreements and the federal courts under Title VII. Rios, a
Mexican American, was promoted on a trial basis and demoted after
only one month. Pursuant to the bargaining agreement between the par-
ties he filed a grievance claiming that the trial period was unreasonable
in length. At the arbitration hearing he assigned discrimination on the
17 Id. at 1594.
18 Id.
12 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970) provides in part: "Suits for violation of contracts be-
tween an employer and a labor organization . . . may be brought in any district
court . ."
20 467 F.2d 54, 5 FEP Cases 1 (5th Cir. 1972).
21 Section 703(a) (1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in part:
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . .. to discriminate against
any individual . . , because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
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basis of national origin as one of the reasons for his demotion. The
arbitrator rejected this contention, ruling that Rios was demoted be-
cause he was unable to perform the job satisfactorily. Prior to the arbi-
tration hearing Rios had filed suit under Title VII. Subsequently, when
the arbitrator's decision became known, Reynolds moved for summary
judgment contending that Rios was bound by the arbitrator's determina-
tion. The district court granted the motion.22
In an earlier case, Hutchings v. United States Industries, Inc.,23
the Fifth Circuit had held that the doctrines of election of remedies and
res judicata did not bar a subsequent suit under Title VII. The court em-
phasized the differences in function between the judicial and the arbitral
processes, both in the scope of their consideration and in remedial power.
In that case the court noted that the arbitrator was limited by the con-
tractual rights and remedies and that Congress had made the federal
judiciary the "final arbiter" of an individual's Title VII grievance."
The court concluded that the power of the federal courts to adjudicate a
violation of Title VII was not affected by a prior arbitral proceeding,"
but, in apparent recognition of the detrimental impact of relitigation on
the national labor policy favoring arbitration, the court raised the
possibility that under certain circumstances not present in Hutchings,
deference to prior arbitral awards might be appropriate in Title VII
actions."
In Rios, unlike Hutchings, the bargaining agreement expressly in-
cluded the employer's obligation not to discriminate under Title VII.
Furthermore, the record showed that the Title VII issue was expressly
considered and rejected by the arbitrator. 27 Thus, the question left open
in Hutchings, that of the propriety of deference, was squarely presented.
Persuaded by the analogy to the NLRB's Spielberg" doctrine, which
establishes that when certain conditions are met the NRLB will, in the
exercise of its discretion, defer to contractual arbitration awards and
withhold its unfair labor practice procedures, the court held:
[TJhe federal district court in the exercise of its power as the
final arbiter under Title VII may follow a like procedure of
deferral under the following limitations. First, there may be
no deference to the decision of the arbitrator unless the con-
tractual right coincides with rights under Title VII. Second, it
must be plain that the arbitrator's decision is in no way viola-
22 467 F.2d at 56, 5 FEP Cases at 2.
23 428 F.2d 303, 2 FEP Cases 725 (5th Cir. 1970).
24 Id. at 311-14, 2 FEP Cases at 731-33.
25 Id. at 313, 2 FEP Cases at 732.
26 Id. at 314 n.10, 2 FEP Cases at 733 n.10.
27 467 F.2d at 55-56, 5 FEP Cases at 2.
28 Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955).
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tive of the private rights guaranteed by Title VII, nor of the
public policy which inheres in Title VII."
The court also required that before deferring the district court be satis-
fied that (1) the factual issues before it are identical to those decided by
the arbitration; (2) the arbitrator had power under the collective agree-
ment to decide the ultimate issue of discrimination; (3) the evidence
presented at the arbitral hearing dealt adequately with all factual issues
presented to the court; (4) the arbitration proceeding was fair and regu-
lar and free of procedural infirmities. The burden of establishing satis-
faction of these conditions was placed on the respondent."
In adopting the policy of conditional deferral, the Fifth Circuit has
demonstrated an awareness of the need for accommodation of the policy
to eliminate discriminatory employment practices with the policy to
encourage the voluntary settlement of industrial disputes through
contractual grievance and arbitration procedures. Rios represents an
attempt to avoid complete relitigation of issues decided by an arbitrator,
a practice which does violence to the essence of arbitration, namely, that
it lead to a final and binding resolution of the dispute. At the same time
it ensures that final determination of statutory rights will not be com-
mitted to the virtually unreviewable discretion of the arbitrator in
contravention of the congressional intent expressed in Title VII to com-
mit that responsibility to the federal judiciary. It is to be hoped that
federal courts faced with the problem of concurrent jurisdiction will
give serious consideration to adopting the Fifth Circuit's solution in
Rios as a matter of uniform federal policy.
III. BOARD-COURT PROCEDURE: Savair
A case decided this Survey year posed an important procedural
question concerning the extent of Board discretion. The substantive
issue from which the question emerged concerned the effect to be
given to a union's waiver of initiation fees contingent upon whether
it won an election. In 1954, the Board in Lobue Brothers1
 took the
view that such union behavior was coercive, and invalidated the sub-
sequent election. Eleven years later the Sixth Circuit, without specifi-
cally designating the issue either as calling for deference to Board
expertise or as a subject for independent court decision, found this
view persuasive and embodied it in court law in NLRB v. Gilmore
Industries, Inc? In 1967, however, the Board reconsidered its Lobue
29 467 F.2d at 58, 5 FEP Cases at 4.
80 Id.
1
 109 N.L.R.B. 1182, 34 L.R.R.M. 1528 (1954).
2
 341 F.2d 240, 58 L.R.R.M. 2419 (6th Cir. 1965). The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed
its Gilmore decision, albeit distinguishing the particular case on its facts, in NLRB v.
Gainer Automotive & Mach., Inc., 400 F.2d 10, 69 L.R.R.M. 2002 (6th Cir. 1968).
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reasoning in DIT-MCO, Inc.8 The Board, after reassessing Lobue,
concluded that the case was grounded in illogic. If the union lost the
election, the Board reasoned in DIT-MCO, the employees would have
to pay neither an initiation fee nor dues, whereas a union victory
would lead to an eventual duty to pay dues regardless of waiver of the
initial fee. Thus, a promise to waive the initiation fee could hardly
coerce employees to vote for the union; the only logical conclusion to
be drawn from union victory subsequent to such a promise would be
that the employees had wanted the union regardless of the waiver.'
Based on this reasoning, the Board overruled Lobue and established
the new rule that a waiver of initiation fees, contingent upon the re-
sults of an election, is not coercive and therefore does not constitute
a basis for setting aside an election.' The Eighth Circuit upheld the
Board's position,' as did the Ninth. 7
The issue came before the Sixth Circuit again, in NLRB v. Savair
Manufacturing Co. 8
 The facts in Savair were similar to those in Lobue,
Gilmore, and DIT-MCO: the union, with an election pending, promised
to waive, in the event of union victory, initiation fees for all employees
who had signed authorization cards. The Board, following DIT-MCO,
found nothing objectionable in this promise and ordered the employer
to bargain with the union.° The Sixth Circuit adhered to its decision
in Gilmore, refused to adopt the Board's DIT-MCO reasoning, and
censured the Board for having assumed that the Board's overruling of
Lobue simultaneously overruled Gilmore, in which Lobue was adopted
by the court.1° The court distinguished its decision from those of the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits, stating that in neither of those circuits was
the court asked to overrule its own previous decision."
The Savair decision creates a division among the circuits regarding
the effect that a union's pre-election promise to waive initiation fees
will have upon the election and the employer's subsequent duty to
bargain. Even more significantly, however, it raises the question: does
the Board have discretion to change its stand and, in so doing, implicitly
to overrule such court cases as have adopted the earlier rule which the
Board seeks to render obsolete? The Sixth Circuit contends that the
Board's assumption of a positive answer to this question exhibits a
misunderstanding of the relationship between the Board and the
8 163 N.L.R.B. 1019, 64 L.R.R.M. 1476 (1967), enforced, NLRB v. DIT-MCO,
Inc., 428 F.2d 775, 74 L.R.R.M. 2664 (8th Cir. 1970).
4 163 N.L.R.B. at 1022, 64 L.R.R.M. at 1478.
5 Id.
0 NLRB v. DIT-MCO, Inc., 428 F.2d 775, 74 L.R.R.M. 2664 (8th Cir. 1970).
7 NLRB v. G.K. Turner Associates, 457 F.2d 484, 79 L.R.R.M. 2932 (9th Cir. 1972).
8 	F.2d —, 82 L.R.R.M. 2085 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3589
(U.S. May 8, 1973).
° Savair Mfg. Co., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 78 L.R.R.M. 1605 (1971).
10 utwia conclude that the Board abused its discretion in declining to follow the
Gilmore decision." 82 L.R.R.M. at 2087.
11 Between the Board's decision in Lobue and its overruling of Lobue in DIT-MCO,
two other circuits passed on the issue of pre-election waiver of union initiation fees.
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courts." It is submitted that the misunderstanding is the Sixth Cir-
cuit's. The Board was created by Congress especially to administer
the NLRA. 13
 The election procedure, in particular, is part and parcel
of the Act, and is under the aegis of the Board"—a fact recognized
by the Supreme Court." Through close, constant and exclusive deal-
ings with labor problems, the NLRB has formed a fund of experience
and expertise upon which to draw in such situations. The entire con-
gressional purpose in establishing a specialized administrative agency
such as the Board is contravened if the courts do not defer to that
agency's expertise .
Such tension between the Board and the court, if left unresolved,
cannot but have a negative effect upon labor relations. With two con-
tradictory rules in force, a union wishing to waive initiation fees will
not know whether such action is lawful; nor, if a union proceeds with
such an offer and wins the election, will an employer be able to ascer-
tain whether it has a duty to bargain. What is more, with a division
among the circuits as well as between the Board and court, the outcome
The First Circuit, in NLRB v. Gorbea, Perez & Morrell, 328 F.2d 679, 55 L.R.R.M. 2586
(1st Cir. 1964), held that a union's announcement that employees who joined the union
immediately would have their initiation fees waived, while those who waited until after
a contract had been signed would have to pay, constituted misrepresentation and sufficed
to end the employer's obligation to bargain with the union. The Board had previously
distinguished the Gorbea facts from those in Lobue on the grounds that the union's
offer of waiver was contingent not upon an election, but upon the signing of a contract,
and had held the behavior therefore unobjectionable. Gorbea, Perez & Morrell, 142
N.L.R.B. No. 55, 53 L.R.R.M. 1048 (1963). The Second Circuit, in Clothing Workers v.
NLRB, 345 F.2d 264, 59 L.R.R.M. 2228 (2d Cir. 1965), found that although the union's
offer to waive initiation fees might have induced employees to sign authorization cards,
the union's action was nevertheless unobjectionable. The possibility of influence was
outweighed by the possibility that, absent such a sweetener from the union, employees
genuinely and independently in sympathy with the union might be reluctant to pledge
financial allegiance to a union that had done nothing tangible for them. The Second
Circuit thus saw the waiver offer not as undue coercion, but as a justifiable manifestation
of the union's good faith. Neither the First nor the Second Circuit has met the issue
since DIT-MCO.
12 82 L.R.R.M. at 2086.
13 See 29 U.S.C. § 156, 160(a) (1970).
14 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970).
15 "We have held in a number of cases that Congress granted the Board a wide
discretion to ensure the fair and free choice of bargaining representatives." NLRB v.
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 767 (1969).
18 It is further submitted that in this instance, the Board's position on the merits
is correct. The overruling of Lobue was not a matter of caprice, but was effected because
the Board found a flaw in its purported logic and did not intend to let illogic remain a
rule. The steps in the Board's reasoning were carefully traced in the DIT-MCO case.
Any illogic alleged against Lobue applies automatically to Gilmore as well. The Board
demonstrated that a union's offer to waive initiation fees contingent upon union victory
in an election, although arguably appearing to be coercion, could not be coercive in fact.
Yet, in Savair, the Sixth Circuit does not answer any of the charges against the Lobue/
Gilmore reasoning; rather, it merely reasserts the Lobue/Gilmore rationale and states
that it has no intention of altering its view. 82 L.R.R.M. at 2086. This smacks more of
wounded pride than of logical reasoning, and leaves the Sixth Circuit defending an
empty formality.
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in a given case will depend upon the location of the employer's place of
business, a highly undesirable outcome." Uncertainty and confusion
rank high among the evils sought to be avoided by Congress in enacting
the NLRA. Therefore, it is to be hoped that the Sixth Circuit will
abandon its position or, failing that, that the Supreme Court will ad-
dress itself to this double difference—that between the circuits, and
that between Board and court—and provide both a clear direction for
unions and employers to follow in future initiation fee-waiver cases,
and a clear hierarchy of authority to be observed in Board-court
relations."
IV. REPRESENTATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY
A. Consolidation of Units through Unit Clarification:
Libbey
-Owens -Ford
In United Glass & Ceramic Workers v. NLRB (Libbey
-Owens-
Ford Co.),' the Third Circuit sustained the Board's authority to merge
existing bargaining units in a unit clarification proceeding. The court
also upheld the Board's authority to conduct an election in a unit clari-
fication proceeding, rejecting the contention that the Board has no
authority to conduct an election in the absence of a section 9(c) question
of representation.' The court limited the propriety of such an election
to cases in which the Board had made a prior determination that two or
more units were equally appropriate. The Board has indicated, however,
that it will not exercise this court-sanctioned authority, and that the
Libbey-Owens-Ford case may well stand alone.'
The dispute in Libbey-Owens-Ford originated when the union peti-
tioned the Board for unit clarification in order to effect the inclusion of
two additional plants in a multiplant unit composed of eight other plants
owned by the company. The union was the bargaining representative for
17 "The public has been treated more than once to unseemly races to court by
opposing counsel seeking review by the 'right' circuit in an important case." Bok,
Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84 Harv. L. Rev.
1394, 1456 (1971).
18 After the completion of this Comment, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Savair, 41 U.S.L.W. 3589 (U.S. May 8, 1973).
1 463 F.2d 31, 80 L.R.R.M. 2882 (3d Cir. 1972). For a full discussion of this case, see
Note, 13 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 355 (1972).
2 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1970) provides that the Board shall direct an election by secret
ballot when it finds that a question of representation exists. Thus, a § 9(c) question of
representation is one which leads to a representation election in which employees choose
whether and by whom they wish to be represented.
8 See Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 189 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 76 L.R.R.M. 1806, 1807 (1971)
(concurring opinion), where Chairman Miller pointed to the fact that the Board has
consistently refused to follow the Libbey-Owens-Ford doctrine, even in cases virtually
indistinguishable. Furthermore, the views of the members of the present Board preclude
application of that doctrine. See text at note 16 infra.
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employees at all ten plants. In Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co.,4 the
Board in an unprecedented ruling ordered an election among employees
at the two separate plants to determine whether they desired to merge
with the multiplant unit. The employees favored the multiplant unit, and
when the company refused to bargain with one of the single-plant units
as part of the multiplant unit, the union brought an unfair labor practice
charge under section 8(a) (5) of the NLRA. 5
 The Board dismissed the
charge.° Members Fanning and Jenkins adhered to the view they ex-
pressed in their dissent to the original Board decision in the case; they
felt that the Board lacked statutory authority to merge units in a unit
clarification proceeding.' Chairman Miller concurred in the result on
the ground that, as a matter of policy, combination of existing appro-
priate units should be accomplished consensually through the bargain-
ing process, although he agreed with dissenting Members Brown and
Kennedy that the Board has the statutory authority to merge separate
units in a clarification proceeding.°
On appeal, the union challenged the dismissal of its section 8(a) (5)
charge, thus placing before the court the issue of the validity of the
underlying unit determination. The company argued that the unit de-
termination procedure employed by the Board was invalid for two
reasons: (1) the Board lacks statutory authority to use the unit clarifi-
cation procedure to consolidate existing bargaining units; and (2) the
Board lacks the authority to conduct an election in the absence of a
section 9(c) question of representation .° The court disagreed. It held
that the existence of a dispute about the scope of a unit was a repre-
sentational issue under section 9(b) 10
 and therefore was a sufficient
basis for invoking the Board's clarification procedure even in the ab-
sence of a question of representation under section 9(c). The court
based its holding on the broad grant of authority contained in section
9 (b) which empowers the Board to determine the appropriate unit."
The court also rejected the company's second contention, noting that
employees' views are relevant in determining the appropriateness of a
bargaining unit; the court held that the Board's broad investigatory
4
 173 N.L.R.B. 1231, 69 L.R.R.M. 1558 (1968). See 1968-1969 Annual Survey of
Labor Relations Law, 10 B,C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 785, 800-02 (1969).
5 29	 § 158(a) (5) (1970) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his employees.
6
 Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 189 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 76 L.R.R.M. 1806 (1971).
7
 76 L.R.R.M. at 1807; see 169 N.L.R.B. 126, 129, 67 L.R.R.M. 1096, 1099 (1968)
(dissenting opinion).
8 76 L.R.R.M. at 1807.
9 463 F.2d at 35, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2884.
10
 29 U.S.C. $ 159(b) (1970) provides: "The Board shall decide in each case whether
. the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer
unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof ...."
11
 463 F.2d at 36, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2885.
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powers impliedly authorized it to conduct an election as a practical way
of determining employee views." The court, however, declared that such
an election is only proper when the Board has already made a finding
that two or more units are equally appropriate. Because a majority of
the Board in dismissing the section 8(a) (5) charge had expressed no
opinion as to the appropriateness of the two units, the court remanded
the cases for that determination?
The Board, on remand, accepted the court's opinion as the law of
the case and reaffirmed its finding that single-plant and multiplant
units constituted equally appropriate units for bargaining. A bargain-
ing order was issued, based upon a finding that the company had vio-
lated section 8(a) (5)." Chairman Miller dissented. He adhered to his
view that the consolidation of existing appropriate units should be ac-
complished through the collective bargaining process. Furthermore, he
questioned the statutory foundation for the finding of an 8(a) (5) vio-
lation when the party is complying with the statutory mandate which, in
Chairman Miller's view, only requires that it bargain in an appropriate
unit."
The Libbey -Owens-Ford decision is not likely to be repeated.
It is evident that this Board will not utilize the unit clarification pro-
cedure in future cases to consolidate existing bargaining units; Members
Jenkins and Fanning believe that the Board lacks the power to do so,
and Chairman Miller that it is inappropriate as a matter of policy."
The significance of the case may lie in the questions that it raises
rather than in its value as precedent. Although the court held that
the Board has the power in the absence of a section 9(c) question
of representation to consolidate existing units through the unit clarifi-
cation procedure and to conduct an election, it does not appear to
have dealt adequately with the difficult questions presented by the
case. In effect, the court held that section 9 (b) is not restricted by
section 9(c) (5) to cases involving a question concerning representa-
tion.' The court, however, failed to give adequate consideration to
12 Id. at 37, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2885. 29 U.S.C. II 161 (1970) gives the Board the right
to issue subpoenas requiring attendance at a hearing. The court reasoned that since
under § 11 the Board could in the exercise of its investigatory power require the presence of
the affected employees at a hearing to determine their sentiment, an election was only a
practical means for the Board to determine employee sentiment. 463 F.2d at 37 n.19, 80
L.R.R.M. at 2885-86 n.19.
18 463 F.2d at 37-38, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2886.
14 Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 202 N.L.R,B. No. 15, 82 L.R.R.M. 1417 (1973).
18 82 L.R.R.M. at 1419 (dissenting opinion).
10 See the plurality and concurring opinions in Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 189 N.L.R.B,
No. 139, 76 L.R.R.M. 1806 (1971).
17 The argument is that § 9(c) (5), which provides that in determining the appro-
priateness of a unit the extent of organization shall not be controlling, transforms the
remainder of § 9(c) into a limitation on § 9(b). See Members Fanning and Jenkins' dis-
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this issue, apparently assuming, contrary to the view of Members
Fanning and Jenkins, that the Board's power is not so restricted.
The court also failed to deal adequately with the issue of the Board's
power to conduct an election absent a section 9(c) question of repre-
sentation. The fact that the Act clearly contemplates only one kind
of election was not treated by the court, and the court did not recognize
the problems of reconciling this new kind of election with provisions
of the Act making the occurrence of "an election" an operative event."
It is highly unlikely that this Board will apply Libbey-Owens-Ford
in future cases. Rather, in light of the views of Members Fanning and
Jenkins and Chairman Miller, it is apparent that the Board will leave
questions regarding the consolidation of existing bargaining units for
resolution at the bargaining table.
B. NLRB Development of Gissel
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,' the Supreme Court left un-
determined whether it would be appropriate to find a section 8(a) (5) 20
violation and issue a bargaining order in cases where the employer
has knowledge, independent of authorization cards, that the union has
a valid majority and refuses to recognize the union but refrains from
committing independent unfair labor practices. 21 When the Board was
faced with that issue in Wilder Manufacturing Co.," it adhered to
what was described in Gissel as its "current practice"28 and issued a
bargaining order. The Board concluded that the employer knew the
union represented a majority because the union had authorization cards
from 11 of the 18 employees in the unit, because the 11 employees
participated in a recognitional strike and because one of its officers
remarked to another that the union had "10 of the 11" employees in
the unit. Nevertheless, the Board did not terminate inquiry with its
finding that the employer possessed independent knowledge of the
union's majority status. The Board further examined the evidence
and relied on the employer's "lack of willingness" to utilize the elec-
senting opinion in the original Libbey-Owens-Ford case, 169 N.L.R.B. at 129, 67 L.R.R.M.
at 1099 (dissenting opinion).
18 For example, § 9(c) (3) provides in part: "No election shall be directed in any
bargaining unit . . . within which in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election
shall have been held. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1970).
19 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
20 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5) (1970) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees.
21 395 U.S. at 601 n.18.
22 185 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 75 L.R.R.M. 1023 (1970). See also Pacific Abrasive Supply
Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 329, 74 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1970), where the Board issued a bargaining
order solely on the basis of a finding that the employer had independent knowledge of
union majority status.
23 395 U.S. at 591.
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tion procedures as evidenced by the fact that it neither filed for an
election nor urged the union to petition for certification. 24
 Wilder thus
established that an employer faced with convincing evidence of a
union's majority status from sources independent of authorization cards
would be subject to a bargaining order unless it took affirmative ac-
tion to bring into play the Board's election machinery. 28
Apparently uneasy with the subjectivity of the independent knowl-
edge test applied in Wilder, the Board in a later case, Summer & Co.
(Linden Lumber)," announced that it was reassessing that test. It
specifically questioned the wisdom of attempting to divine, in retro-
spect, the state of employer (1) knowledge and (2) intent at the time
it refused to accede to a demand for recognition." In Linden Lumber,
the union requested recognition after obtaining cards from all twelve
employees in the unit. The employer refused recognition, claiming that
the union did not represent a majority. At a.pre-hearing conference the
employer attempted to introduce evidence of supervisory taint; 20
 when
provoked by the hearing officer's rightful refusal to hear that evidence,
it declared that it would not bargain even if the union won a Board
election. Subsequently, the employer indicated that if the union sub-
mitted a new petition supported by a showing of support of 30% of
the employees, the company would agree to a consent election. How-
ever, when the union produced a statement of support signed by nine
employees, the employer again refused recognition. A majority of the
employees struck in support of the demand for recognition. 29
A bare majority of the Board refused to grant a bargaining order.
The majority declared that an employer should not be found in vio-
lation of section 8(a) (5) solely on the basis of its refusal to accept
evidence of majority status other than the results of a Board election
unless, as in Snow & Sons," it had agreed with the union upon an
alternate means of determining majority status." The policy to be
served, according to the Board, is that of encouraging voluntarism
while ensuring that the preferred route of a secret election is available
to those who do not find any alternate route more acceptable." Wilder
24 75 L.R.R.M. at 1024-25.
28 See 1970-1971 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 12 B.C. Ind. & Corn, L.
Rev. 1026, 1057-58.
26 190 N.L.R.B. No, 116, 77 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1971).
27 77 L.R.R.M. at 1309.
28 The employer argued that because the union has been organized by supervisors, it
would be unlawful for the company to recognize it. Id. at 1306.
29 Id. at 1306-07.
80 134 N.L.R.B. 709, 49 L.R.R.M. 1228 (1961).
81 77 L.R.R.M. at 1309. The Board reads Snow narrowly. In that case the Board is-
sued a bargaining order on the basis of a finding that the employer had no reasonable
doubt as to the union's majority status. 134 N.L.R.B. at 710-11, 49 L.R.R.M. at 1229.
32 77 L.R.R.M. at 1309.
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was distinguished on the basis of the lack of willingness on the part
of the employer in that case to utilize the Board's election machinery."
However, given the employer's announcement in Linden Lumber that
the company would refuse to abide by the results if an election were
conducted, the basis for this distinction would appear to be non-
existent.
Members Fanning and Brown dissented in Linden Lumber. They
stated that the majority approach was contrary to the principle that
an employer may not avoid or delay its statutory obligation to bargain
where there is no real dispute that a union represents a majority of
its employees; they declared that the majority in effect overruled
Wilder, which had not turned on an agreement to determine the union's
status by an alternate route but rather on substantial evidence demon-
strating knowledge of the union's majority status together with a lack
of evidence indicating willingness to utilize the election machinery."
During the current Survey year, the Board reaffirmed the Linden
Lumber rule that absent independent unfair labor practices a bargain-
ing order will not issue unless the employer and the union have agreed
on an alternate means of resolving the issue of majority status. The
Board also recognized an additional circumstance in which a bargain-
ing order will issue. In Nation-Wide Plastics Co." and Sullivan Electric
Co.," the Board issued bargaining orders to remedy situations in
which an employer refused recognition after determining by means of
a personal poll of the employees that the union had majority status.
In both Nation-Wide Plastics and Sullivan Electric, the union pre-
sented the employer with authorization cards from a majority of em-
ployees and demanded recognition. Subsequently, the employers con-
ducted a poll of the employees which showed that a majority of the
employees supported the union's demand for recognition; nevertheless,
each employer continued to refuse to bargain with the union. 37 In Na-
tion-Wide Plastics the Board declared that neither Linden Lumber nor
Gissel was applicable." The Board noted that there could be only one
lawful purpose for such a poll in the face of a union organizational cam-
paign and only one lawful response once the employees have thereby
made their preference for a union known. The Board pointed out that
the employees had indicated their preference for a union under con-
ditions much less favorable than those which would prevail at a Board
election and that the employer, who could have insisted upon a Board
33 Id.
34 Id. at 1311-12 (dissenting opinion).
85 197 N.L.R.B. No. 136, 81 L.R.R.M. 1036 (1972).
38 199 N.L.R.B. No. 97, 81 L.R.R.M. 1313 (1972).
37
 81 L.R.R.M. at 1037-38; 81 L.R.R.M. at 1313.
88 81 L.R.R.M. at 1038.
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election, had chosen this route. The Board concluded that no legitimate
interest under the Act would be served by withholding a bargaining or-
der in these circumstances."
In Sullivan Electric the administrative law judge relied upon
Wilder and found that the employer knew that the union had majority
status and thus violated section 8(a) (5) by refusing to bargain. A
majority of the Board pointed out that the principles underlying Wilder
had been re-examined in Linden Lumber; however, citing Nation-Wide
Plastics and Snow & Sons it held that the facts of this case gave rise to
a bargaining obligation." Member Fanning concurred on the basis of his
dissenting opinion in Linden Lumber and on the basis of Nation-Wide
Plastics.' Member Kennedy, who had not participated in Nation-Wide
Plastics, dissented. He criticized the majority's reliance upon Snow &
Sons, stating that the case was not relevant to Sullivan Electric because
in Sullivan Electric the employer and the union had never agreed on a
means for resolving the issue of majority status. Therefore, he would
conclude that Linden Lumber controlled and that the complaint should
be dismissed. He further argued that bargaining orders are not appropri-
ate absent a finding of an unfair labor practice which cannot be erased
by traditional remedies."
During the current Survey year, the Board, for the purpose of
ensuring continuity in its decisions, reconsidered Wilder. The Board
concluded that the effect of Linden Lumber was to overrule its Wilder
decision." The majority stated:
[13] oth here and in Linden, we have answered the questions
left open by the Supreme Court in Gissel and refused to enter a
bargaining order on the basis of cards or other circumstantial
evidence of majority status, where there has been no voluntary
agreement on a means of resolving majority status and when
the road to a free and fair election has not been impeded by un-
lawful employer conduct."
The majority noted that the record was devoid of any evidence that the
employer attempted as in Nation-Wide Plastics or agreed as in Snow &
Sons to determine majority status by any means other than a Board
election. The majority concluded that in the absence of independent un-
fair labor practices, the employer had not violated section 8 (a) (5).43
BO Id. at 1038-39.
40 81 L.R.R.M, at 1314-15 & n.1.
41 Id. at 1314 n.l.
42 Id, at 1315 (dissenting opinion).
43 Wilder Mfg. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 81 L.R.R.M. 1039, 1040 (1972).
44 81 L.R.R.M. at 1041.
45 Id. at 1040.
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The complaint was dismissed. Member Fanning dissented, as in Linden
Lumber, on the ground that in the absence of a bona fide dispute as to
the existence of the requisite majority of eligible employees, an em-
ployer's denial of recognition violates section 8 (a) (5). In his opinion the
signing of authorization cards by a majority of employees, together with
their participation in a picket line and strike and the employer's con-
cession that the union had majority status, compelled a finding that the
employer had knowledge of the union's majority status and that the
employer had, therefore, violated section 8 (a) (5) by refusing recog-
nition.46
It would appear that the unanswered question of Gissel has now
received a firm, if not unanimous, answer by the Board. A majority,
Chairman Miller and Members Penello and Jenkins, agree that an em-
ployer may, in the face of a union demand for recognition, insist that a
question concerning representation be resolved by a Board election,
absent agreement upon another method of determining the union's ma-
jority status or a unilateral poll of a majority of the eligible employees."
The majority thus focuses on the employer's right to an election." It
does not dispute Member Fanning's contention that absent a real dis-
pute as to the existence of the requisite majority support for the union,
the employer has an obligation to bargain. However, as the Board an-
nounced in Linden Lumber, it has abandoned any attempt to ascertain
the 'subjective state of an employer's knowledge. Instead, it has given
the employer the benefit of a presumption of ignorance which can only
be rebutted by a showing that he reneged on an agreement to determine
the union's majority status through an alternate method or that he took
a poll which revealed to him that the union did have majority status.
This rule expressed and applied during the Survey year in Nation
-Wide
Plastics, Wilder and Sullivan Electric has the advantage of administra-
tive simplicity. Furthermore, it is designed to achieve the announced
Board policy of encouraging the principle of voluntarism while keeping
open the preferred route of a Board election. Unlike the rule advocated
by Member Fanning, it is not subject to the criticism that it encourages
industrial unrest by treating recognitional striking and picketing by a
majority of eligible employees as evidence of employer knowledge of
union majority status.
46 'Id. at 1041-42 (dissenting 'opinion).
47 The poll must establish that the union has majority status. In R & M Electric
Supply Co., 200 N.L.R.13. No. 59, 81 L.R.R.M. 1553 (1972), decided during the Survey
year, Members Miller and Jenkins held that the employer's interrogation of only two out
of nine employees did not rise to the level of a poll which revealed majority status.
Member Fanning dissented.
48 Member Kennedy can be expected to vote with the majority in all but cases in
which a bargaining order is issued on the basis of an employer's unilateral poll of a
majority of the employees. See text at note 42 supra.
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V. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Duty to Bargain
1. Surface Bargaining: Borg-Warner, U.S. Gypsum 	
•
Section 8(a) (5) of the NLRA' provides that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the rep-
resentative of its employees. Section 8(d) 3 outlines the bargaining
obligation. That section requires the employer to bargain in "good
faith" with respect to "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment .. . ." 3 A ruling on the merits of a bad faith bargaining
charge is often difficult in that it ultimately "involves a finding of mo-
tive or state of mind which can only be inferred from circumstantial
evidence."' In cases where there has not been an outright refusal to
bargain on demand, the question may become
whether it is to be inferred from the totality of the employer's
conduct that he went through the motions of negotiation as
an elaborate pretense with no sincere desire to reach an agree-
ment if possible, or that it bargained in good faith but was
unable to arrive at an acceptable agreement with the union.°
In dealing with charges of "surface bargaining"—negotiation without
the intention of entering into an agreement—the Board must exercise
restraint in examining an employer's proposals, since it "may not,
either directly or indirectly, compel concessions or otherwise sit in judg-
ment upon the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements."'
However, the Board is not precluded from examining employer pro-
posals in an attempt to determine the existence of good faith:
[w]hile the Board cannot force an employer to make a "con-
cession" on any specific issue or to adopt any particular posi-
tion, the employer is obliged to make some reasonable effort
in some direction to compose his differences with the union,
1 Section 8(a)(5) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject
to the provisions of section 159(a) . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
2 Section 8(d) defines the bargaining obligation as "the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
B Id.
4
 NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 139-40, 32 L.R.R.M. 2225, 2233
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
O Id. at 134, 32 L.R.R.M. at 2227 (emphasis added).
0 Borg-Warner Controls, a Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 93,
80 L.R.R.M. 1790 (1972).
7 NLRB V. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952).
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if § 8(a) (5) is to be read as imposing any substantial
obligation at all .8
The illusive nature of the good faith obligation has been under-
scored during the Survey year by the split decisions of two Board
panels in surface bargaining cases. In Borg-Warner Controls, a Divi-
sion of Borg
-Warner Corp, a Board panel, with Chairman Miller
dissenting, found an 8(a) (5) violation because of the employer's in-
flexible attitude on substantive contract terms and on the procedure
of the negotiation meetings. The panel majority found that the em-
ployer's initial proposals were substantially the same as the existing
terms and conditions of employment, although some proposals involved
a reduction of employee benefits.' The employer never altered any
of its original proposals as to economic issues. 11 After twenty negotia-
tion meetings spanning eight months, no agreement was reached on
any of the major economic or non-economic issues. Turning to the
employer's attitude on the procedural aspects of bargaining, the ma-
jority found that the employer refused to consider alternatives to its
determinations as to the frequency and timing of meetings. The em-
ployer further refused to release employees, without compensation, for
negotiations during working hours and refused to make its negotiators
available during working hours."
In finding that the employer engaged in surface bargaining in
violation of 8(a) (5), the majority relied on the totality of the em-
ployer's conduct, which "demonstrated an unyielding rigidity during
negotiations which made collective bargaining a futility!" 13
 The ma-
jority indicated that the issue was not whether the employer made
enough concessions, although the majority did state that the employer's
position on economic issues " 'was generally lacking in concessions
of value and is strongly suggestive of an intention on its part to engage
g NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134-35, 32 L.R.R.M. 2225, 2228
(1st Cir. 1953).
9 198 N.L.R.B. No. 93, 80 L.R.R.M. 1790 (1972).
10 80 L.R.R.M. at 1791. The proposals involving reduction included those "related
to vacation pay, holiday pay, merit increases, rest periods, report pay, sick leave pay,
and the grievance procedure." Id.
11 Id. at 1792.
12 The Board also considered, as background information, the employer's denial to
the union of access to its plant for the purpose of securing information on job classifica-
tions, although the Board was precluded from basing an unfair labor practice finding
on this conduct.since it did not occur during the six month limitation period of 1 10(b)
of the NLRA. The Board's power to issue unfair labor practice complaints is limited
by a proviso to § 10(b), which states, in relevant part, "Mhat no complaint shall
issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the
filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person
against whom such charge is made . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970).
13 80 L.R.R.M. at 1794.
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in sterile discussions, accompanied by illusory and meaningless con-
cessions, without real intention of engaging in the type of bargaining
that could lead to the execution of a labor contract.'"" In his dissent,
Chairman Miller maintained that the Board was exceeding its statu-
tory authority and was, in effect, forcing the employer to make con-
cessions." He pointed out that there was no evidence of "union animus
or hostility to the bargaining process," and that the majority's finding
of an 8(a) (5) violation was "predicated upon . . . [the employer's]
lawfully held positions with respect to certain procedural matters and
its failure to make economic concessions."'
The majority's ruling in Borg-Warner is indicative of the Board's
continued readiness to find that a party, in spite of its willingness to
meet and discuss proposals, has engaged in surface bargaining. Al-
though Chairman Miller in his dissent spoke of the need for "caution"
in finding surface bargaining absent specific acts violative of 8(a) ( 5) ,17
his position would appear to preclude surface bargaining rulings in
many instances by virtually prohibiting an examination of the em-
ployer's proposals. It is submitted that the panel majority exercised
the necessary "caution" as to the employer's proposals and properly
based its finding on the totality of the employer's conduct.
The Survey year saw another Board panel, with Chairman Miller
once again dissenting, find that an employer had engaged in surface
bargaining in Wal-Lite Division of United States Gypsum Co? The
charged party was a successor employer" which had acquired an
existing plant and had voluntarily adopted the collective bargaining
contract between the predecessor employer, Wallace Manufacturing
Co., and the union. Seven months before new contract negotiations
began, the employer's labor relations manager indicated to union
leaders that he planned to " 'break [the Union] " and that the em-
ployer would never sign a new contract with certain of the clauses
of the Wallace contract.2° The union admitted that the Wallace con-
tract "had led to inefficient and uneconomical operations."2'
The parties held a total of five bargaining sessions. At the first
14 Id. at 1792, quoting Sweeney & Co., 176 N.L.R.B. 208, 212, 71 L.R.R.M. 1197,
1202 (1969), enforced in part, 437 F.2d 1127, 76 L.R.R.M. 2321 (5th Cir. 1971).
15 80 L.R.R.M. at 1194,
15 Id.
17 Id.
18 200 N.L.R.B. No. 132, 82 L.R.R.M. 1064 (1972).
19 For discussion of developments in the area of successorship, see text at notes
85-112 infra,
29 82 L.R.R.M. at 1065. The clauses included an arbitration provision, a clause
prohibiting foremen from doing rank-and-file work, a penalty clause, a seniority pro-
vision and a safety committee clause. Section 10(b) precluded the Board's finding an
unfair labor practice on the basis of these statements. See note 12 supra.
21 82 L.R.R.M. at 1069 (dissenting opinion).
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session the employer submitted terms for a new contract which were
modeled on a contract between the union and the employer at another
• plant and which vastly reduced many of the Wallace contract's em-
ployee benefits. At the second session -the union submitted virtual
renewal of the Wallace contract as a counterproposal. Following the
second session the employer sent its employees letters in which it
stated its intention not to yield in the event of a strike and implied
that the union was stalling the negotiations. 22 At the third and fourth
sessions the parties discussed each other's proposals • and disagreed
as to whether the Wallace contract should form the basis of a new
contract. The employer devoted the fifth and final session to the sub-
mission, on a "final," " Nake it or leave it' " basis, of its original
proposal modified to include terms which provided increased economic
benefits. Although economic matters had not been previously discussed,
the employer stated that further bargaining would be "futile"; the
employer did, however, willingly meet with the union during the ensuing
strike.23
The majority of the Board panel, in finding a surface bargaining
violation, relied upon various factors which, "although insufficient if
standing alone or considered in isolation to support a refusal-to-bargain
violation, in their totality demonstrate[d] . . . [the employer's]
lack of good faith." 24
 The majority pointed to the limited authority
of the employer's chief negotiator as one factor. Also considered sig-
nificant was the fact that the employer's take it or leave it proposal
"so substantially slashed existing employee benefits that [the employer]
could not reasonably have expected the Union to acquiesce." 25 Another
factor viewed as indicative of bad faith was the employer's presenta-
tion of its final offer "before there had been any genuine attempt
through bargaining to narrow the differences in the parties' positions." 2°
Finally, the labor relations manager's warning to the union was viewed
as the display of a "cavalier attitude" and the employer's letters were
interpreted as an attempt "to denigrate the Union in the employees'
eyes . ."27 The majority concluded that the employer lacked "serious
intent to adjust differences and to reach an acceptable common
ground."28
Chairman Miller dissented, pointing to the employer's willingness
to explain its proposals and discuss the union's counterproposals. He
22 Id. at 1065, 1068.
28 Id. at 1066, 1070.
24 Id. at 1066.
25 Id. at 1067.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1067-68.
28 Id. at 1068.
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argued that the union's position—demanding that the Wallace terms
be retained—was "as fixed and predetermined" as the employer's."
The employer's voluntary assumption of the Wallace contract during
the transition period after its acquisition of the Wallace plant should,
according to the dissent, have been treated as "strong affirmative evi-
dence of good faith . .. ."" Chairman Miller also questioned the
majority's dismissal of the employer's proposals as predictably un-
acceptable to the union. He pointed out that the proposals were based
on another contract between the same parties, that the union had
admitted that the Wallace contract it was attempting to maintain
had created inefficiencies, and that the employer's economic terms
involved increased employee benefits.'
The panel's decision in United States Gypsum appears to create
the possibility of a broadening of the definition of surface bargaining.
One indication of this broadening is the fact that the proposal as to
which the employer "could not reasonably have expected the Union
to acquiesce"" was actually based on terms the union had found ac-
ceptable at another plant. The majority states that the presentation
of a predictably unacceptable offer may be a factor indicative of bad
faith, but the two cases cited by the majority in support of the use
of this factor involved employer proposals which, unlike the proposals
in the instant case, offered the unions almost nothing of value." While
reliance on this factor may have been misplaced, it is nonetheless
submitted that the totality of the factors considered by the majority
supports the finding of an 8(a) (5) violation. It is further submitted
that Chairman Miller's suggestion that the employer's assumption
of the Wallace contract is strong evidence of good faith may be faulted
for ignoring the realities of the employer's situation. Although the
Supreme Court held during the Survey year that a successor employer
need not adhere to the terms of its predecessor's collective bargaining
20 Id. at 1068-70.
89 Id. at 1069.
31
 Id. Chairman Miller also took the position that the employer's letters were
privileged expressions, that the statements about breaking the union were unimportant
since the manager involved did not personally participate in the bargaining, and that
there was "no clear evidence" that the employer's chief spokesman had "unduly
limited" authority. Id. at 1069-70.
32 Id. at 1067.
33 In the first case cited by the majority, NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co.,
205 F.2d 131, 139, 32 L.R.R.M. 2225, 2233 (1st Cir. 1953), the employer's proposed
contract contained only two provisions, a recognition clause and a work hours clause;
it bypassed all the major items the union had proposed for inclusion. In the second
case cited, Mississippi Wood Preserving Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1370, 1378, 70 L.R.R.M. 1021
(1968), the Board termed predictably unacceptable an employer's proposal which had
no economic terms and which included a clause giving the employer exclusive authority
over many areas normally subject to the collective bargaining process.
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agreement," the legal obligations of a successor employer were un-
settled at the time the employer in the instant case adopted its
predecessor's contract. Moreover, this same employer had been required
by the Fifth Circuit to adhere to a predecessor's contract in a different
case three years prior to its adoption of the Wallace contract." How-
ever, it is submitted that in future cases where a successor has, in a
true spirit of voluntary cooperation, assumed its predecessor's contract,
the Board should follow Chairman Miller's suggestion that such con-
duct is strong evidence of good faith towards the bargaining rights
of employees.
2. Employer Withdrawal from Multi-Employer Unit
A number of cases decided during the Survey year illustrate the
circumstances under which an employer may withdraw from a multi-
employer unit and indicate a willingness on the part of the appellate
courts to reject the Board's application of the rules it has developed in
this area. Although multi-employer units can only be established with
the consent of all parties, the Board prevents a union or an employer,
as a measure of "momentary expedience" or "strategy in bargaining,"
from withdrawing in a manner which would have an "unstabilizing and
disrupting effect of multiemployer collective bargaining."" In Retail
Associates, Inc." the Board indicated that, prior to the date set for
the start of contract negotiations, withdrawal would be allowed upon
adequate written notice. However, once negotiations were in progress
withdrawal would not be allowed, absent unusual circumstances, unless
there was mutual consent. In the case of a withdrawal during negotia-
tions by an employer, a union's conduct can create the implication of
consent or acquiescence towards the employer's actions." The exis-
tence of an impasse in the negotiations has also been considered an
important factor, although it is unclear whether an impasse constitutes
an excuse for withdrawal or is merely evidence of "unusual circum-
stances!'"
In I .C. Refrigeration Service, Inc.," a Survey year case, the Board
majority refused to find violations of section 8(a) (1) and (5) 41 where,
34 NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
35 United States Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers, 384 F.2d 38, 66 L.R.R.M.
2232 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1042 (1968).
80 Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B, 388, 394, 42 L.R.R.M. 1119, 1121 (1958).
87 Id.
88 Atlas Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 27, 56 L.R.R.M. 1442 (1964).
so Compare Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 26 L.R.R.M. 1501 (1950),
enforced in part, 190 F.2d 576, 28 L.R.R.M. 2364 (7th Cir, 1951), with Ice Cream Council,
Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 865, 55 L.R.R.M. 1059 (1964).
40 200 N.L.R.B. No. 107, 81 L.R.R.M. 1529 (1972).
41 Section 8(a) (1) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
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after the union and the employer association concluded an agreement,
four employers withdrew from the association and refused to execute
the contract. Using the union's willingness to engage in individual
bargaining as a prime indicator of consent or acquiescence, the ma-
jority found acquiescence because the union, in an attempt to settle
its 8(a) (1) and (5) charges, presented the four employers with pro-
posals different from those offered the association, and considered the
employers' counterproposals." Member Fanning dissented on the ground
that conduct during settlement discussions could not be used as evi-
dence of acquiescence."
The Eighth Circuit in Fairmont Foods Co. v. NLRB" found that
the existence of an impasse and of union acquiescence made an em-
ployer's withdrawal permissible. The Board had held" that the em-
ployer, Fairmont Foods Co. [Fairmont], violated 8(a) (1) and (5)
by refusing to execute a contract which the employer association and
the union had agreed upon after Fairmont withdrew from the asso-
ciation. The Board majority found that since attempts to reach an
agreement had not ended at the time of the withdrawal, despite the
existence of a strike, there was no impasse. Further, the majority
implied that an impasse alone would not excuse the withdrawal." The
union's failure to protest at the time of the withdrawal was not found
to be sufficient evidence of acquiescence. In a dissenting opinion, Chair-
man Miller found it "incongruous" that Fairmont was found guilty
of bad faith bargaining when its withdrawal, which freed the asso-
ciation from its veto over contract terms, enabled the union and the
association to move closer to agreement 4z
The Eighth Circuit denied enforcement to the Board's order. The
court found that there had been an impasse, noting that the association
and the union had rejected each other's final offer and that the union
had resorted to individual bargaining with three other members of the
employer association. Without mentioning the contrary implication
in the Board's opinion, the court held that an impasse excuses with-
to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in § 7. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970). It should be noted that the withdrawals under
discussion are not refusals to negotiate in the sense that withdrawals accompanied by a
declination to bargain individually on demand would be. Section 8(a)(5) provides that
it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employee; subject to the provisions of section 159(a) . . ."
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
42 81 L.R.R.M. at 1533 & n.12.
48 Id.
44 471 F.2d 1170, 82 L.R.R.M, 2017 (8th Cir. 1972).
45 Fairmont Foods Co., 196 N.L.R,B, No. 122, 80 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1972).
40 80 L.R.R.M. at 1175.
47 Id. at 1175-76.
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drawal from a multi-employer bargaining unit." The court agreed that
the union's failure to protest Fairmont's withdrawal was not deter-
minative, but it considered this silence to be one factor which, when
taken with the union's willingness to meet separately and discuss "eco-
nomic issues" with Fairmont and its conclusion of interim agreements
with other employers, constituted acquiescence excusing the with
In another Survey year decision, a finding by the Board that there
was no acquiescence was upheld, but the Board's refusal to find an
impasse was rejected. In a 1971 decision, Hi-Way Billboards, Inc.,"
the Board found that there was no impasse in spite of the fact that
negotiations with the employer association had broken off and that
the union had gone on strike. Great reliance was placed on an admis-
sion by the employer's negotiator that agreement had been close. The
Board also found that the union's willingness to "study" the employer's
counterproposals and its acceptance of the "ostensible withdrawal" of
two other members of the association after their agreement to be
bound by any contract made with the association did not constitute
individual bargaining or acquiescence."
The Fifth Circuit, in NLRB v. Hi-Way Billboards, Ine.,52 affirmed
on the acquiescence issue but held that there had been an impasse.
The fact that the association's last offer, which the union had termed
an "ultimatum," had been rejected by the union, when coupled with
the strike and a pessimistic assessment of the situation by a federal
mediator, required the finding of an impasse in spite of the "isolated"
evidence of the negotiator's admission." After deciding that there had
been an impasse, the court stated that it was "without an opinion as
to the legal consequence of that fact," and remanded to the Board so
that it might "be given the first opportunity to decide whether an
impasse such as found here excuses" the withdrawal."
The decisions of the Board and the courts in LC. Refrigeration,
Fairmont Foods and Hi-Way Billboards show that the standards for
determining whether an acquiescence by the union or an impasse in
negotiations exists have not been clearly defined. Individual bargaining,
either with the withdrawing employer or with other individual mem-
bers of the employer association, is clearly the prime indicator of
acquiescence. The I.C. Refrigeration union's willingness to offer the
48 471 F.2d at 1172, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2018.
45 Id. at 1173-74, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2019-20.
55 191 N.L.R.S. No. 37, 77 L.R.R.M. 1461 (1971).
81 77 L.R.R.M. at 1463.
— F.2d	 82 L.R.R.M. 2527 (5th Cir. 1973).
53 82 L.R.R.M. at 2530-31.
54 Id. at 2532.
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withdrawing employer terms not included in its agreement with the
employer association may reasonably be viewed as conduct inconsistent
with the employer's continued membership in the association. How-
ever, the union's willingness to discuss "economic issues" in Fairmont
Foods
—a willingness apparently unaccompanied by the presentation
of new terms to the employer—is difficult to distinguish from the
readiness of the Hi-Way Billboards union to study new proposals. The
Eighth Circuit in Fairmont Foods felt that by discussing economic
issues, even in a context devoid of concrete proposals, "the Union did
more than simply demand that Fairmont sign the agreement executed
with the Association, all that would have been required had the Union
felt Fairmont was still a member of the Association!'" This analysis
of the Eighth Circuit can be applied with equal force to the union's
agreement to study new proposals in Hi-Way Billboards. It is sub-
mitted that in evaluating that union's conduct, emphasis should be
placed on the test apparently relied upon by the Board—whether or
not the union has made offers to the withdrawing employer which
differ from those presented to the employer association. Such a test
would allow for greater certainty and consistency in this area."
. The Survey year cases also fail to provide clear standards for
determining the existence of an impasse. The Board has indicated that:
[w]hether a bargaining impasse exists is a matter of judg-
ment. The bargaining history, the good faith of the parties
in negotiations, the length of the negotiations, the importance
of the issue or issues as to which there is disagreement, the
contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state
of negotiations are all relevant factors to be considered in
deciding whether an impasse in bargaining existed."
While a certain amount of flexibility in weighing these factors is
desirable, it is submitted that there is merit in the Fifth Circuit's
criticism of the Board's reliance in Hi-Way Billboards on an isolated
statement by a negotiator.
The contrast between the Fairmont Foods court's holding that
an impasse always excuses a withdrawal and the inability of the Hi-
Way Billboards court to determine the legal effect of an impasse
55 471 F.2d at 1174, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2020.
56 On the subject of a union's negotiations with individual employers other than
the withdrawing employer, the description in the Board's opinion of the agreements
reached in Hi-Way Billboards may not be detailed enough for comparison to the interim
agreements in Fairmont Foods, but it is questionable whether the distinction between
the two situations is sufficient to explain the opposite results reached by the Fifth
and Eighth Circuits,
57 Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478, 64 L.R.R.M. 1386, 1388 (1967),
enforced, 395 F.2d 622, 67 L.R.R.M. 3032 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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graphically illustrates the present confusion over this issue. Although
the Board at times has, as the Eighth Circuit recognized in Fairmont
Foods, indicated that impasse constitutes an excuse," at other times
it has implied that impasse alone does not excuse withdrawal." It is
submitted that a genuine impasse reached through good faith bargain-
ing creates a situation in which the policy justification for restrictions
on the right of withdrawal has little application. In situations in which
there is no prospect of reaching an agreement through multi-employer
bargaining, withdrawal by a union or an employer could only have a
beneficial, rather than a disruptive or unstabilizing effect, on the bar-
gaining process. The Fairmont Foods case illustrates this point, since
there the withdrawal made it possible to end the impasse." For this
reason, it is submitted that a genuine impasse should always be treated
as an excuse for withdrawal.
Another interesting aspect of the problem of withdrawal froin
multi-employer units was raised in NLRB v. Field & Sons, Inc."
There the First Circuit was faced with a situation in which a small
employer withdrew from an employer association during a strike which
culminated in the voluntary resignation of all the employer's union
employees. Although the' court denied enforcement to the Board's
order against the employer on other grounds, it strongly implied by
way of dictum that a party to a multi-employer bargaining unit should
have the right to resign at any time during the course of the negotia-
tions, despite the lack of either acquiescence or impasse. The court
implied that, rather than maintain a rigid rule against withdrawal,
the Board should allow withdrawal, absent some showing of bad faith
or "adverse effect upon the bargaining process."" The court indicated
that the Board's rigid restrictions appeared to be inconsistent with the
Board's posture in NLRB v. Textile Workers Local 1029 (Granite
State)," where it maintained that a union member should be free to
withdraw from a union during a strike and return to work. The court
stated that "[i]f an employee who has agreed to a strike can with-
draw, we do not see why an undertaking to engage in multi-employer
bargaining is an irrevocable agreement under all circurnstances." 64
It is submitted that while the two situations outlined by the court
58 See Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409, 26 L.R.R.M. 1501 (1950).
59 See Fairmont Foods Co., 196 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 80 L.R.R.M. 1172, 1175 (1972);
Ice Cream Council, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 865, 55 L.R.R.M. 1059 (1964).
co Fairmont Foods Co. v. NLRB, 471 F.2d 1170, 1173, 82 L.R.R.M. 2017, 2019-20
(8th Cir. 1972).
F.2d —, 80 L.RR.M. 2534 (1st Cir. 1972).
62 80 L.R.R.M. at 2535.
68 446 F.2d 369, 77 L.R.R.M. 2711 (1st Cir. 1971). For a discussion of the issues
raised in this case, see text at pp. 1224-27 infra.
64 80 L.R.R.M. at 2536.
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are similar in terms of abstract rights, there are special problems
presented by the employer's withdrawal which are not presented in
the case of a resigning employee. It is doubtful whether the good faith
and adverse effect tests proposed by the court would work as effec-
tively as the Board's Retail Associates rules in preventing the utiliza-
tion of withdrawal as a bargaining stratagem. It is submitted that the
Retail Associates rules should be retained to provide better protection
for multi-employer bargaining, which, as the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized, is "a vital factor in the effectuation of the national policy
of promoting labor peace through strengthened collective bargain-
ing . . . .""
3. Employer's Decision to Sell Facility: General Motors
In UAW v. NLRB (General Motors Corp.)," a Survey year
decision, the District of Columbia Circuit upheld a Board determina-
tion that an employer's decision to sell part of its enterprise was not
a mandatory subject of bargaining.° In delineating the nature of the
bargaining duty in the area of managerial decisions, a balance must
be struck between the interests of the employees on the one hand and
the " 'right of an employer to run his business' " on the other." As
to all managerial decisions of this nature, the Board and the courts are
agreed that the employer has a duty to bargain about the effects of
the decision." There has, however, been conflict and uncertainty over
the extent of the duty to bargain about the managerial decisions them-
selves." In developing the bargaining duty, the Board and the courts
have utilized the Supreme Court's ruling in Fibreboard Paper Prod-
ucts Corp. v. NLRB" that an employer must bargain regarding its
decision to subcontract work performed by its own employees. The
Court had emphasized in Fibreboard that its decision was limited to
the particular facts and should not be applied to all subcontracting
decisions." In concluding that a duty to bargain over the subcon-
65 NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 95 (1957).
470 F.2d 422, 81 L.R.R.M. 2439 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
67 Section 8(d) requires bargaining "with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). A refusal to bargain over
an 8(d) mandatory subject constitutes a violation of § 8(a) (5). See NLRB v. Wooster
Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
08 UAW v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422, 424, 81 L.R.R.M. 2439, 2441 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
citing NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 195, 60 L.R.R.M. 2033,
2035 (3d Cir. 1965).
00 See, e.g., the cases listed in General Motors Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 77
L.R.R.M. 1537, 1540 n.9 (1971).
7(1 See 1971-1972 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 13 B.C. Ind. & Com. L.
Rev. 1347, 1408-13 (1972).
71 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
72 Id. at 215.
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tracting decision would not constitute a significant abridgement of the
employer's freedom to manage its business, the Court noted that there
had been no alteration of the company's basic operation or investment
of capital and that the employer had "merely replaced existing em-
ployees with those of an independent contractor to do the same work
under similar conditions of employment."'"
In General Motors Corp." the Board was faced for the first time
with the issue of whether the bargaining duty extends to decisions
to sell part of the employer's business. The Board held that the em-
ployer's transfer of its facilities to a franchisee was a sale' of business;
the decision to sell was beyond the mandatory bargaining duty since,
unlike the Fibreboard subcontracting decision, it involved "the very
core of entreprenurial control."'" The Board did not examine any
special needs of the particular employer and rested its finding of the
preeminence of employer over employee interests on the general needs
of secrecy and of the freedom to make managerial decisions quickly
and decisively, as well as the likelihood that the employees and their
representatives would be unfamilar with the "determinative financial
and operational considerations" behind a decision to sell." Members
Fanning and Brown dissented on the ground that the employer's trans-
fer was the equivalent of the Fibreboard subcontracting situation and
that, therefore, the employer was bound to bargain about the decision."
The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed in a two-to-one split
decision. The court stated that there were two independent situations
in which the courts require bargaining prior to the managerial decision.
It found that bargaining is required only when "the decision appears
to be primarily designed to avoid the bargaining agreement with the
union or . . . [i] f the decision . . . [did not result] in the termination
of a substantial portion or a distinct line of the employer's business
. . . [nor in] a major change in the nature of its operations . . . .""
78 Id. at 213.
74
 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 77 L.R.R.M. 1537 (1971). The Board majority also
found that the employer had fulfilled its duty to bargain over the effects of its decision
to sell.
75 The dissent by Chief Judge Bazelon at the Court of Appeals level noted that
the sale established "a close symbiotic relationship" between the employer and its new
franchisee and that the employer could terminate the franchisee's sublease of the
employer's facilities at will. UAW v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422, 428 n.13, 81 L.R.R.M. 2439,
2444 n.13 (1972) (dissenting opinion). However, the majority of the court found that
the employer and its franchisee had treated the transaction as a sale and further found
that the transaction simply conformed to the employer's nationwide policy of converting
its retail outlets to independent franchises or dealerships. Id. at 425, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2442.
Ts 77 L.R.R.M. at 1539.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 1540-43.
7° 470 F.2d at 424, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2441.
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The court found that there was no duty to bargain over the decision,
since there was "no claim . . . of anti-union bias" and since the em-
ployer's decision was "at the core of entrepreneurial controL" 8° Chief
Judge Bazelon dissented, arguing that the Board had created a "blanket
exemption" from the bargaining duty for every employer transaction
which would constitute a "sale" under property law." He indicated
that the Board's rule would be an invitation to employers to circum-
vent the bargaining duty imposed by Fibreboard by making subcon-
tracts appear to be sales. He stated that a case-by-case balancing of
employer and employee interests was needed to determine the extent
of the bargaining duty in every case, regardless of whether the em-
ployer "is negotiating a subcontract, a sale, or a franchise." 82
It would appear that Judge Bazelon is correct in his character-
ization of the approach of the Board and court majorities as creating
a "blanket exemption" in cases involving sales of businesses, since
the employer interests granted preeminence by the Board—the need
for secrecy and for the ability to act quickly—are extremely general
in nature. However, it is submitted that the Board and the District of
Columbia Circuit have, by creating such an exemption, properly lim-
ited the scope of the bargaining duty mandated in section 8(d). If
the description of the mandatory subjects in that section—"wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" 83—is to be
viewed as imposing any limits on the scope of the duty to bargain,
then an employer's decision to sell part of its business must be left
as an area of managerial discretion. Although the danger of circum-
vention of Fibreboard is present in some cases, it may be more ap-
parent than real. This danger is lessened by the Board's willingness
to examine the employer's conduct, regardless of characterization as
a sale, when there is a claim of anti-union animus. The danger may
also be lessened by the Board's power to require an employer to bar-
gain about the effects of a decision to sell in a way that will involve
bargaining over some aspects of the decision itself.'"
4. Successor Employer: Burns
This Survey year saw an attempt on the part of the Supreme Court
to resolve an issue that has been hanging in the balance for eight years.
The Supreme Court held in NLRB v. Burns International Security
80 Id. at 425, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2442.
81 Id. at 427-28, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2443-44.
82 Id. at 428, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2444.
88
 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
84 See 1971-1972 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 13 B.C. Ind. $ Corn. L.
Rev. 1347, 1411-13 (1972).
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Services, Inc." that a successor employer has a duty only to bargain
with the representative of its predecessor's employees; no duty exists
to adhere to the terms of the predecessor's collective bargaining agree-
ment."
Prior to 1964, successor employers were not obliged to honor the
substantive terms of their predecessors' collective bargaining agree-
ments. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 87
 however, unsettled
any assumption that this would always be the case. Wiley was a section
301 88
 suit to compel arbitration brought against an employer who took
over a company by merger. The Court held that the arbitration clause
of the predecessor's collective bargaining contract was binding on the
successor despite both the expiration of the agreement and the dis-
appearance of the predecessor through merger. The Court reasoned
that a collective bargaining agreement is in a category of its own
and is not to be governed by conventional contract theory."
Since arbitration occupies a central role in national labor policy,"
one obvious alternative is to read Wiley narrowly as applying only to
arbitration clauses. Despite this obvious interpretation a number of
court(' and board' cases saw Wiley as inviting full survival of the
substantive terms of a collective bargaining agreement in the successor-
ship situation. The Burns decision marks an end to such extrapolation
85 406 U.S. 272 (1972). For a detailed discussion of Burns and its implications,
see Note, 14 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 193 (1972).
86 406 U.S. at 281-91. The vote was 5-4, with the Chief Justice and Justices Brennan
and Powell joining in Justice Rehnquist's dissent.
87 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
88 Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act grants federal courts
jurisdiction to hear suits for violation of collective bargaining contracts. 29 U.S.C.
§ 185 (1970).
89 376 U.S. at 548-50.
ao Id. at 549.
01 E.g., Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954, 56 L.R.R.M.
2466 (9th Cir. 1964) (successor employer which purchased the assets of a limited partner-
ship was bound by the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement); United Steel-
workers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891, 56 L.R.R.M. 2721 (3d Cir.
1964) (limiting holding to successor's duty to arbitrate, but leaving the possibility of
full contract survival open by giving the collective bargaining agreement special status
as other than a conventional contract); United States Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers,
384 F.2d 38, 66 L.R.R.M. 2232 (5th Cir. 1967) (successor bound by the arbitration
provisions of its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement despite the union's loss
of majority status and decertification).
92 E.g., Overnight Transp. Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 1185, 61 L.R.R.M. 1520 (1966),
enforced, 372 F.2d 765, 65 L.R.R.M. 1006 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 838 (1967)
(successor's effecting of unilateral changes before bargaining with the incumbent union
constituted an unfair labor practice, thus effectively, if not explicitly, mandating survival
of the substantive terms of the contract); Perms Vinyl Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 968, 65
L.R.R.M. 1168 (1967), enforced sub nom. United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB,
398 F.2d 544, 68 L.R.R.M. 2913 (5th Cir. 1968) (successor ordered to remedy unfair
labor practices perpetrated by its predecessor).
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from Wiley. Dismissing Wiley as pertaining solely to the discrete area
of arbitration," the Supreme Court instead based its decision on
H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB." Porter held that the Board lacks the
power to order an employer to grant a dues check-off provision to a
union with which it had refused to bargain. To substhtiate its hold-
ing, the Porter Court relied upon section 8(d) of the NLRA which
provides that the obligation to bargain collectively "does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a conces-
sion."" Porter involved an original employer rather than a successor,
and the creation of a substantive contract term rather than survival
of a contract already in existence; thus, it is as factually distinguish-
able from the Burns situation as is the section 301 suit to compel
arbitration in Wiley.
Just as it can be seen that neither Wiley nor Porter is factually
applicable to Burns, so it emerges that section 8(d) cannot be un-
equivocally relied upon as mandating the Court's Burns holding, for,
in addition to the freedom of contract language relied upon by the
Court, 8(d) also speaks to the issue of sanctity of the collective
bargaining process." This sanctity of the bargaining process would
support an extrapolation," particularly in view of the importance of
collective bargaining to the proper functioning of the NLRA, that the
agreement which is the culmination of such bargaining should survive
a change of employers. Wiley and Porter are not on point; the
statute is ambiguous. The Court's dismissal of Wiley and espousal of
Porter thus indicates that underlying Burns was a policy decision to
support freedom of contract, with the concomitant freedom of a pro-
spective successor to fix the terms on which to run an assumed business,
at the expense of sanctity of the collective bargaining agreement with
its concomitant employee security."
DD 406 U.S. at 286.
94 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
00 Section 8(d) provides, with certain stated exceptions, that "where there is in
effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an industry affecling
commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract
shall terminate or modify such contract . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970) (emphasis
added),
07 Extrapolation is necessary in that § 8(d), which technically only binds parties
(of which the successor would not be one), does not speak to the successorship situation
or to the question of contract survival within that situation. Nevertheless, such an
extrapolation from the wording of § 8(d) is not far-fetched. See Note, 14 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 193, 200-01 (1972).
98 The majority finds contract survival a greater threat to the employer than lack
of contract survival would be to the employee:
[Molding either the union or the new employer bound to the substantive terms
of an old collective-bargaining contract may result in serious inequities. A poten-
tial employer may be willing to take over a moribund business only if he can
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Albeit Burns clearly holds that a successor need not honor the
substantive terms of his predecessor's contract, the case may not
prove dispositive of the ambiguities in the successorship area. Two
potential loopholes are evident. First, the majority's declaration that
"[1] esolution turns to a great extent on the precise facts involved
here"" opens the way for decisions in which Burns is easily distin-
guished. This is so because Burns obviously involves a unique set
of facts: 1" it is a successorship situation in which there has been no
sale, merger, or transfer of assets. Second, the Burns opinion includes
dictum which imports ambiguity into the holding:
Although a successor employer is ordinarily free to set
initial terms on which it will hire the employees of a predeces-
sor, there will be instances in which it is perfectly clear that
the new employer plans to retain all of the employees in the
unit and in which it will be appropriate to have him initially
consult with the employees' bargaining representative before
he fixes terms.'"
There are several problems in interpreting this dictum. An initial
question is, how clear is "perfectly clear"? Delineation of some stan-
dard of clarity obviously presents a major problem. Assuming it is
"perfectly clear" that the employees will be retained, the scope of the
successor's duty to "consult" with the employees' representative is
unclear. If the successor must bargain to impasse, the procedure could
be an extended one that might outlast the term of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. Thus, under an interpretation requiring bargaining
to impasse, the dictum could allow in through the back door the very
contract survival that Burns purports to bar at the front.
Assuming that mere "consultation" as opposed to impasse bar-
gaining is required before changes may be made, or that unilateral
make changes in corporate structure, composition of the labor force, work loca-
tion, task assignment, and nature of supervision. Saddling such an employer with
the terms and conditions of employment contained in the old collective-bargaining
contract may make these changes impossible and may discourage and inhibit
the transfer of capital.
406 U.S. at 287-88. The majority goes on to show that nonsurvival can also be beneficial
to the union:
On the other hand, a union may have made concessions to a small or failing
employer that it would be unwilling to make to a large or economically successful
firm. The congressional policy manifest in the Act is to enable the parties to
negotiate for any protection either deems appropriate, but to allow the balance
of bargaining advantage to be set by economic power realities.
Id.
°' Id. at 274.
100 Id. at 286,
101 Id. at 294-95.
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changes may be effectuated upon impasse, this dictum also invites
speculation concerning whether, once changes are permissible, the
successor may institute any unilateral changes it desires, or whether
there will be some changes which will be foreclosed. And, if "consulta-
tion" rather than bargaining to impasse is to be the requirement, how
much discussion will be seen to comprise "consultation"?
During the Survey year, both the courts and the Board have inter-
preted Burns. In NLRB v. Wayne Convalescent Center, 162 the Sixth
Circuit held that the Board erred in finding a section 8(a) (5) violation
based upon a successor employer's unilateral changes in vacation pay,
sick pay and overtime rates without consulting or negotiating with
the predecessor's employees' representative.'" The holder of a mortgage
on the Clark Convalescent Home foreclosed and formed the Wayne
Convalescent Center. This successor maintained substantially the same
operations, patients, and personnel. Nevertheless, the court found it
not "perfectly clear" that the successor intended to retain all of its
predecessor's employees, since a plan to convert the institution from
a nursing home to a bed-and-board facility was under consideration
at the time at which the unilateral changes were made.'" There was
no indication that the successor considered the change at great length
or with any degree of seriousness, or that it ever in fact occurred.
Thus it can be inferred that the Sixth Circuit demands little to remove
a situation from the scope of the "perfectly clear" dictum in Burns.
Furthermore, the very fact that the Sixth Circuit felt compelled to
establish the Wayne situation as being outside this dictum indicates
the potential of this loophole in the Burns holding. Since the court
found the Burns dictum inapplicable, it made no determination as to
the extent to which the successor might have to bargain before effect-
ing changes and whether, for that matter, the dictum might imply
that unilateral changes could not be made at all.
The Seventh Circuit encountered Burns in NLRB v. Bachrodt
Chevrolet Co.'" One employer (Bachrodt) succeeded another (Zim-
merman) through purchase of assets. Zimmerman's employees had an
unexpired collective bargaining agreement of which Bachrodt was
informed before the transfer of title. Zimmerman's employees received
102 465 F.2d 1039, 81 L.R.R.M. 2129 (6th Cir. 1972).
108 Id. at 1042-43, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2131.
104 Id. at 1042 n.6, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2131 n.6.
too
	 F.2d	 81 L.R.R.M. 2244 (7th Cir. 1972), vacated, 41 U.S.L.W. 3526
(U.S. April 3, 1973). The case was remanded to the Seventh Circuit with instructions to
remand to the Board in light of Burns. This remand does not alter the validity of the
Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Burns, since the remand is based on the underlying
conviction that the Board, rather than the court, should have had the first chance to
reconsider Bachrodt in light of Burns.
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job applications from Bachrodt; on the day that Bachrodt began
operating, all but two of them reported for work. On that same day,
Bachrodt, having refused to meet with the union, unilaterally changed
a number of the working conditions. The Board ordered Bachrodt,
as successor, to honor Zimmerman's contract with the union.1" Be-
tween the Board's decision and the consideration of the case by the
Seventh Circuit, the Burns decision issued. Implementing Burns, the
Seventh Circuit held that Bachrodt was under no obligation to honor
the contract of its predecessor. The Bachrodt court did not view the
"perfectly clear" language in Burns as derogating from the Burns
holding. Instead, this dictum was interpreted as meaning only that,
when it is perfectly clear that all former employees will be retained,
the successor employer must bargain to impasse with the union before
instituting unilateral changes 1 07
 The dissent saw in the majority's
holding a danger of contract survival being tacitly effected while
overtly rejected,'" in the situation in which the impasse date might
arrive after the date of contract expiration. Furthermore, the dissent
pointed out, the majority's requirement of bargaining to impasse as a
condition precedent to unilateral changes failed to take cognizance of
the import of the Burns holding. The Burns holding relies heavily on
the policy of encouraging the transfer of capital by allowing prospec-
tive purchasers to make their own novel decisions as to how they might
run the business. 109
 To the extent that the date on which they may so
innovate is postponed, the policy basis of Burns is undermined—
perhaps fatally.
In sum, the Sixth Circuit concentrated on the words "perfectly
clear" and avoided wrestling with the dictum by merely stating that
the "perfectly clear" situation did not apply to the case at hand. The
Seventh Circuit concentrated on the extent to which the successor
must bargain with the union assuming that the "perfectly clear"
criteria have been met.
The Board has also recognized the "perfectly clear" dictum as a
possible exception to the Burns holding. However, the Board, by a
I" Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 186 N.L.R.S. No. 151, 76 L.R.R.M. 1597 (1970).
101 81 L.R.R.M. at 2249.
108 As a practical matter I wonder how much difference there is between a
holding that the new owner is bound by the terms of the old contract, and
a holding that he is bound only until he has bargained to impasse with the
union. No doubt there are cases in which the impasse date would arise much
sooner than the contract expiration date, but in my judgment the time interval
between those dates is not of critical importance in evaluating the policy factors
involved.
Id. at 2251.
109 406 U.S. at 287-88. See 81 L.R.R.M. at 2250 n.7, 2251.
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circuitous route, has restricted the dictum so narrowly as to almost
reinforce the absolute ban on contract survival implied by the strict
holding of Burns.
In S-H Food Service, Inc 110 the Board was faced with a successor-
ship situation in which it was markedly evident that almost all
employees would be retained and that work would continue substan-
tially unaltered. If the situation described in the Burns dictum had
any application at all, it applied here. In this instance, however, the
predecessor had a collective bargaining agreement which included an
insurance clause, and in fact did provide insurance for his employees.
As part of its cessation of operations, the insurance coverage was
cancelled. The Board stated its interpretation of Burns:
We . . . interpret the law to be that a successor may not
unilaterally institute changes in existing terms and conditions
of employment, and that 'existing terms' must refer to those
of the predecessor in situations where substantially the entire
employee complement is taken over by a successor without
hiatus and with no change in operation 111
Drawing an extremely meticulous distinction between "contract clause"
and "term or condition of employment," the Board then went on to
hold that the contract provision for insurance, qua contract provision,
did not have to be upheld. The predecessor having himself cancelled
the insurance; it was no longer an operative term or condition of
employment at the time of the takeover.112 This seems to leave to the
predecessor the decision as to whether provisions of its collective
bargaining contract will survive a change in employers. The Board
sees the Burns "perfectly clear" dictum as barring the automatic sur-
vival of a provision included in the agreement unless that term is also
being presently effected as a condition of employment. A predecessor's
decision to cancel or not to cancel a condition of employment provided
in its collective bargaining agreement simultaneously sets the parame-
110 199 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 81 L.R.R.M. 1181 (1972).
111 Id. at 1182.
112 Id. An interesting question arises as to the status of the predecessor upon
cancellation of the insurance coverage. The S-H Food Service opinion is silent as to
its fate, but it is at least arguable that its action was itself an unfair labor practice. If so,
there is some authority for the proposition that a successor might have to remedy the
unfair labor practices of its predecessor. See Perma Vinyl Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 968, 65
L.R.R.M. 1168 (1967), enforced sub nom. United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB,
398 F.2d 544, 68 L.R.R.M. 2913 (5th Cir. 1968). If such practice is not an unfair
labor practice, the question then arises: might not the cancellation of benefits become
a condition precedent in merger and purchase offers? Certainly this is a result greatly
to be avoided.
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ters of its successor's duty toward that particular clause of the contract
as well.
It is submitted that both the Seventh Circuit in Bachrodt and the
Board in S-H Food Service have given Burns strained interpretations.
The dissent in Bachrodt isolated clearly the problems inherent in the
majority's "bargain to impasse and then make unilateral changes"
interpretation: it allows for effective contract survival if the impasse
date is long in coming, and substantially undermines the policy basis
of Burns, i.e., greatest possible flexibility to the enterprising successor.
The Board's S-H Food Service interpretation is more unwieldly still.
Rather than consider contract survival entirely foreclosed by Burns,
the Board first makes a somewhat specious distinction between a
contract term and a contract term being presently effected as a condi-
tion of employment, and then proceeds to make survival of the term
contingent upon this distinction—leaving, in the process, much power
in the hands of the predecessor. And yet, although its method is forced
and circuitous, the Board arrives at a conclusion more consistent with
the Burns holding than is the Seventh Circuit's. Perhaps the Sixth
Circuit in Wayne, shying away from the dictum in Burns and adhering
to the narrow holding of that case, has given Burns the most reasonable
interpretation. It is arguably a safer route to focus in on the ambiguous
words "perfectly clear," decide (as did the Sixth Circuit in Wayne)
that the situation at hand is something less than "perfectly clear,"
and revert to the Supreme Court's holding that a successor is under no
duty to honor the substantive terms of its predecessor's bargaining
contract. On the other hand, the weakness inherent in this approach
will be exposed the first time the Sixth Circuit is faced with a successor-
ship situation in which nothing has changed but the name of the
employer. At such a point, the court will have the choice of either
grappling with the difficulties of the Burns dictum or overtly stating
its intention to adhere to the Burns holding and ignore the dictum
altogether. An approach which did not overtly state such an intent
might torture Burns rather than interpret it.
It is submitted that the Board and courts, when dealing with the
contract survival area, would be well advised to face the Burns dictum
as precisely that—mere dictum—and avoid the pitfalls of forced rea-
soning and specious distinctions by adhering to the strict holding of
Burns. It is further submitted that the Supreme Court should avail
itself of the next feasible opportunity to reassert its mandate that
successors not be required to uphold predecessors' collective bargain-
ing agreements, and should do so in an opinion free of potentially
confusing dicta.
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B. Employer Discrimination
1. Solicitation/Distribution Rules
Decisions by the Board and the courts during the Survey year
pointed up the difficulties involved in balancing the parties' interests in
formulating standards for no-solicitation and no-distribution rules. In
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,' decided in 1956, the Supreme Court
established a fundamental distinction between the standards applicable
to non-employee union organizers and those applicable to employees.
The Court ruled that an employer may forbid non-employees from
solicitation for a union and distribution of union literature on its
property, provided that the union organizers may reach the employees
by reasonable efforts through other available channels and that the em-
ployer does not discriminate against the union by allowing other
solicitation or distribution on the premises.2 Concerning rules ap-
plicable to employees, the Board, since its 1962 Stoddard-Quirk Manu-
facturing Co.' decision, has maintained that employers' rules prohibiting
employee organizers from distribution or solicitation during non-
working time in nonworking areas are presumptively invalid.
a. Central Hardware—In Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB' the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the viability of the balancing of interests
mandated in Babcock & Wilcox and limited the scope of the test it had
developed in Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Mc!'
The employer's rule In Central Hardware prohibited non-employee
union organizers from contacting employees on any part of its property,
including parking lots which were maintained by the employer adjacent
to its store and which were generally open to the public. The Board°
and the Eighth Circuit' found a violation of section 8(a) (1) , 8 relying
on Logan Valley, in which the Supreme Court held non-employee
picketing in a shopping center to be constitutionally protected activity
on the ground that the center, though private property, was open gen-
erally to the public and, thus, took on some of the attributes of public
property for First Amendment purposes.°
The Central Hardware Court ruled that Babcock & Wilcox, rather
1 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
2 Id. at 112.
3 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 51 L.R.R.M. 1110 (1962).
4 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
5 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
• Central Hardware Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 491, 73 L.R.R.M. 1422 (1970).
7 439 F.2d 1321, 76 L.R.R.M. 2873 (8th Cir. 1971).
▪ Section 8(a)(1) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
§ 7. 29 U.S.C.	 158(a)(1) (1970).
9 391 U.S. at 319-20.
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than Logan Valley, was controlling. The Logan Valley doctrine was
limited to cases, such as those involving large shopping complexes,
where the employer's property "assume[s] to some significant degree
the functional attributes of public property devoted to public use.""
The Court emphasized that while freedom of communication is im-
portant to the free exercise of organization rights, intrusion on the
employer's property rights can only be allowed if " 'the inaccessibility
of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by non-em-
ployees to communicate with them through the usual channels . . . " 11
Since the Eighth Circuit had not considered the case in light of the
Babcock & Wilcox principle of accommodation between organization
and property rights, the case was remanded."
The significance of the Supreme Court's decision in Central Hard-
ware lies in its refusal to, bypass Babcock & Wilcox's stringent re-
quirements for union intrusion on property rights and its refusal to
broaden the scope of the Logan Valley concept of quasi-public property
to include, in effect, "every retail and service establishment in the
country, regardless of size or location." 18 It is submitted that, in view
of the fact that the accommodation of rights approach has not created
an unreasonable impediment to employee exercise of the right of self-
organization, the Court correctly reaffirmed the need for the balanced,
case-by-case approach which Babcock & Wilcox initiated.
b. New Pines, Dexter Thread—Two decisions handed down after
the Central Hardware ruling—one by the Second Circuit, the other by
the Board—illustrate the difficulties encountered by non-employee
organizers in meeting the Babcock & Wilcox tests. In 1971 the Board
in New Pines, Inc. 14 found a section 8(a) (1) violation where employees
residing in the employer's resort hotel were inaccessible, in spite of
"strenuous [union] efforts at communication," due to the employer's
ban on non-employee solicitation and distribution." The Second Circuit
denied enforcement, stating that the union's "minimal" and "lacka-
daisical" effort during the first half of its organizing drive fell far short
of the " 'reasonable' attempts to communicate with the employees"
10 407 U.S. at 547.
11 Id. at 544, quoting NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
12 The Eighth Circuit, on remand, denied enforcement to the Board's order. 468 F.2d
252, 81 L.R.R.M. 2468 (1972). The court noted the absence of evidence of union attempts
to utilize such means of communication with employees as "letter, newspaper or radio
advertising or . . . invitations to union meetings," and it indicated that "'[t]he burden
was not on the Company to show that conventional means of communication and access
were open, but the contrary burden rests with the General Counsel.' " Id. at 255-56,
81 L.R.R.M. at 2470-71.
18 Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 547 (1972).
14 191 N.L.R.B. No. 144, 77 L.R.R.M. 1543 (1971).
15 77 L.R.R.M. at 1545.
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required by Babcock & Wilcox.16
 During the first half of the union
drive, the organizer made little effort to contact the employees even
though at least 80 percent of the work force lived off the hotel premises
and, thus, was unaffected by the solicitation-distribution ban. Unfor-
tunately for the union, its intensification of efforts coincided with a
seasonal shift in employee residences which brought 40 to 50 percent
of the work force onto the restricted premises. The court rejected the
Board's focus on the union's "strenuous" efforts during the last half
of its drive. The court apparently felt that a union's failure to exploit
all available avenues of communication during one portion of its drive
is not necessarily rectified by greatly intensified later efforts, 'since the
existence of "reasonable attempts" is to be determined on the basis
of "the whole organizing period.""
In Dexter Thread Mills, lnc.,18 the Board, faced with a fact
situation similar to that in Central Hardware, refused to find that an
employer violated 8(a) (1) by banning non-employee solicitation and
distribution in the parking lot adjacent to its retail store. Noting that
the Central Hardware Court held that Logan Valley "did not apply to
single-store cases," the Board applied the balancing of interests test
established in Babcock & Wilcox." The Board found that, as an al-
ternative to soliciting in the employer's parking lot, the union organizers
could have obtained a list of employee names and addresses indirectly
by copying the license numbers of cars entering and leaving the lot
during changes in employee shifts. Use of this list to implement
"direct home contact" with the employees, when combined with "greater
utilization of sympathetic employees," might have provided "reason-
able, albeit perhaps more expensive and less convenient, means of
reaching employees ....s 20
The attitude of the Second Circuit in New Pines and of the Board
in Dexter Thread illustrates the importance of Central Hardware, since
both decisions stress the Babcock & Wilcox test of the availability of
alternative means of communication with employees. The decisions sug-
gest that union organizers may be required to actually explore, through
"reasonable" efforts, every possible alternate method of reaching the
employees, regardless of the relative expense and inconvenience of
these methods, before the union will be allowed to intrude upon an em-
ployer's property rights. The Second Circuit's New Pines decision also
10 NLRB v. New Pines, Inc., 468 F.2d 427, 429, 81 L.R.R.M. 2423, 2424 (1972).
For discussion of Babcock & Wilcox, see text at notes 1-2 supra.
17
18 199 N.L.R.B, No. 113, 81 L.R.R.M. 1293 (1972).
18 81 L.R.R.M. at 1294. For discussion of Babcock & Wilcox, see text at notes 1-2
supra.
20 Id. at 1295.
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suggests that a union's failure to exploit transitory opportunities for
employee contact .might negative its otherwise "reasonable" efforts at
communication.
c. McDonnell Douglas
—Another Survey year case involved an
emplOyer rule which treated employees who were not on their working
shifts as though they were non-employees. In McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. NLRB, 2' the employer, an aircraft manufacturer which was required
by the government to maintain an elaborate security system, promul-
gated a rule forbidding non-employees from distributing literature or
soliciting on company premises, including parking lots, at any time.
An addendum to the rule stated that employees were allowed on com-
pany premises only during their working hours "and a reasonable period
before and after those hours"; at other times they were to be treated
as non-employees." A panel of the Board, by a two-to-one majority,
found the rule violative of section 8 (a) (1 ), since the employer pro-
Vided insufficient justification for the rule's vagueness and its equation
of employees and non-employees." The Eighth Circuit denied enforce-
ment and remanded for further consideration.
The court did not question the propriety of the Board's main-
taining, as it has since its Stoddard-Quirk Manufacturing Co.24
 decision,
that a rule forbidding employee solicitation and distribution in non-
working areas during non-working time is presumptively invalid. How-
ever, the court held that
when, in attempting to rebut that presumption, an employer
makes a creditable showing of special, justifying circum-
stances, as was done in this case, the Board in weighing that
evidence must responsibly and in a meaningful way consider
the importance of the proffered justification and thereby deter-
mine whether the actual impact of the contested rule upon § 7
rights mandates the invalidation of the rule. 25
In focusing on the asserted vagueness of the words "reasonable
time" in the employer's rule, the Board, according to the court, avoided
an evaluation of the employer's security justification for the rule and
"rendered only lip service to the balancing of interests test."" The court
indicated that the Board should have considered the alternative means
which were available to the employee organizers of communicating
with their fellow employees. It further suggested that an off-duty em-
21 472 F.2d 539, 82 L.R.R.M. 2393 (8th Cir. 1973).
22 Id. at 542, 82 L.R.R.M. 2395.
23 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 78 L.R.R.M. 1705, 1706 (1971).
24 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 51 L.R.R.M. 1110 (1962).
28 472 F.2d at 545-46, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2397.
20 Id. at 547, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2398.
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ployee might have "attained a status as to § 7 rights somewhere be-
tween that of •
 an employee and that of a non-employee." 27
The appellate court's decision is significant in that it provides for
a balancing of interests test, similar to that devised in Babcock &
Wilcox for non-employee organizers, for off-duty employees. Once the
employer makes a "creditable showing of special, justifying cir-
cumstances," the court suggests that consideration should be given to
alternative means of communicating with the employees. Although such
an approach might represent a weakening of the presumptive invalidity
of prohibitions on solicitation and distribution in non-working areas
during non-working times, it is submitted that the flexibility of this
approach would allow the Board to take fully into account all signifi-
cant aspects of particular solicitation-distribution cases. However, it is
further submitted that, in light of the favored position of employee
organizers, the stringent requirements placed on the non-employee
union organizers in such cases as New Pines and Dexter Thread should
not be applied to off-duty employees. In particular, the considerations
of relative convenience and expense, which were found irrelevant in
the case of non-employee organizers in Dexter Thread, should be given
substantial weight in evaluating the impact of solicitation-distribution
rules on the section 7 rights of employee organizers.
2. Race and Sex Discrimination: Jubilee
The Board, in Jubilee Manufacturing Co.," a Survey year decision,
ruled that discrimination based on race or sex is not per se violative
of the NLRA. This ruling stands in sharp conflict with the 1967 deci-
sion in Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB (Farmers' Cooperative Com-
press)." In that decision, the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that
an employer's racial discrimination necessarily constitutes a violation
of section 8(a) (1). The court noted that an 8(a) (1) finding must
rest on conduct which "interferes with or restrains discriminated em-
ployees from exercising their statutory right to act concertedly . . . .""
The court then stated that employer discrimination on the basis of race
or national origin sets up an unjustified clash of interests between
groups of employees and induces employee apathy or docility which
inhibits employees from asserting rights. It was held that "the con-
fluence of these two factors sufficiently deters the exercise of Section 7
rights as to violate Section 8(a)(1)."'
27 Id., 82 L.R.R.M. at 2399.
28 202 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 82 L.R.R.M. 1482 (1973).
20 416 F.2d 1126, 70 L.R.R.M. 2489 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
903 (1969).
an Id. at 1135, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2494.
27 Id., 70 L.R.R.M. at 2495 (emphasis in the original).
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- In Jubilee the Board for the first time made explicit its rejection of
the court's rationale." The union charged that the employer had dis-
criminated in favor of its male employees in setting its wage rates and
that the employer had thereby violated section 8 (a) (1) and (3)." How-
ever, the Board did not resolve the issue of whether there had, in fact,
been discrimination," since it ruled that
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, standing alone, which is all that is alleged herein, is not
"inherently distractive" of employees' Section 7 rights and
therefore is not violative of Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the
Act. There must be actual evidence, as opposed to speculation,
of a nexus between the alleged discriminatory conduct and the
interference with, or restraint of, employees in the exercise
of those rights protected by the Act."
The Board found it was "by no means inevitable" that employer dis-
crimination would set one group of employees against the other; it
was noted that the opposite effect was possible—employee groups might
coalesce and become militant, rather than docile, in the face of dis-
crimination." The Board majority cautioned that it was not concluding
that race or sex discrimination "is necessarily or always beyond the
reach" of section 8 (a) (1) and (3), but only that the finding of a
violation of the NLRA would depend upon a showing of "the necessary
direct relationship" between the alleged discrimination and promotion
of collective bargaining, protection of section 7 rights and free rep-
32 The Board majority carefully avoided an evaluation of the District of Columbia
Circuit's holding on the remand of Farmer? Cooperative Compress. See Farmers' Coopera-
tive Compress, 194 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 78 L.R.R.M. 1465 (1971).
33
 The union had also charged that the employer violated section 8(a)(5) by
insisting to the point of impasse on the contractual provision which, according to the
union's allegations, enabled the employer to practice discrimination. 82 L.R.R.M. at 1484.
However, the Board majority found that the employer had not been responsible for the
impasse. Id. at 1485.
34
 A three-member majority of the Board indicated that it had "serious doubts"
about the administrative law judge's finding of nondiscrimination. Id, at 1484. Of the
employer's five job classifications, all the jobs in the three lowest-paying groups were
filled by women, the fourth group was exclusively male, and the fifth and highest was
filled by both men and women, although the men in the fifth group were paid higher
wages than the women in the same group with greater seniority. Id. at 1486 (dissenting
opinion). Member Fanning concluded that the evidence did not warrant a finding of sex
discrimination; he did not reach the issue of whether such discrimination should constitute
a per se violation. Id. at 1485-86 (concurring opinion). Member Jenkins concluded that the
evidence established "at least a prima fade case of sex discrimination." Id. at 1487 (dis-
senting opinion).
35
 Id. at 1484.
55
 Id. For a detailed criticism of this point by Member Jenkins, see Farmers' Coopera-
tive Compress, 194 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 78 L.R.R.M. 1465, 1473 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
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resentation elections." In a lengthy dissent, Member Jenkins main-
tained that race or sex discrimination is "inherently destructive" of
section 7 rights and argued that the victims of discrimination need not
present specific evidence of interference with those rights."
It would appear that the Board's characterization of race and sex
discrimination as potential rather than per se unfair labor practices
will enable the Board to deal with such discrimination on a practical,
case-by-case basis. The Board can develop a presumptive rule similar
in its effect to the approach of the court in Farmers' Cooperative Com-
press, although the Board has made it clear that it has no present
inclination towards such a presumptive rule. The Board's approach in
Jubilee also has the advantage of enabling the Board to avoid becoming
a forum for all charges of racial discrimination when, in some instances,
utilization of a Title VII forum might be more appropriate, since in
such a forum employer discrimination can be challenged regardless of
its effect on the right of employees to participate in concerted ac-
tivities."
It would also appear that the approach adopted by the majority
in Jubilee is more consistent with the Board's established per se doctrine
than the policy enunciated by Member Jenkins and by the Farmers'
Cooperative Compress court. Traditionally, the Board has required an
explicit and necessary causal connection between a violation of statutory
rights and activity that it classifies as a per se unfair labor practice.
Thus, a per se rule is merely a shorthand method of describing the rela-
tion between a certain kind of behavior and the infringement of a right
protected by the NLRA. A per se rule may never become a substitute
for fulfillment of the requirement of a direct and necessary causal link
between the violation and the activity." The contrast between the per
se rule proposed by Member Jenkins and the per se rule he cited in his
dissent as an example of the operation of the per se doctrine—the
presumptive invalidity of overly broad employer restrictions on union
solicitation—serves to highlight the distinctions between the Board's
traditional approach and Member Jenkins' proposed approach. The
Board did not establish its per se rules in the solicitation area on the
basis of speculations about the possible psychological effects of solicita-
tion restrictions on employees. Rather, it examined over the course of
decades the actual impact on section 7 rights of solicitation restrictions;
it then codified in 1962 the results of "a mass of Board and court
87 82 L.R.R.M. at 1484.
88 Id. at 1489-90 (dissenting opinion).
88 See Tipler v. E.I, duPont de Nemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 129, 3 FEP Cases
540, 542 (Gth Cir. 1971),
40 Cf. Section of Labor Relations Law, American Bar Association, The Developing
Labor Law (C. Morris ed. 1971) 322 ff., summarizing per se refusals to bargain.
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litigation."4z In contrast to the cautious development of the per se rules
in the solicitation area, at the present time the establishment of a per
se rule as to race and sex discrimination could only be based upon the
unsupported assertions of interference with section 7 rights contained
in the only two cases of this nature which have thus far been brought
before the Board: Farmers' Cooperative Compress and Jubilee.
In light of the present lack of evidence which would support a
finding that race and sex discrimination are inherently destructive of
section 7 rights, it is submitted that the Board's position in Jubilee is
legally correct. However, it must be noted that the union in Jubilee will
have the opportunity to seek review of that decision by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia.'" Should that court reverse the
Board's decision, a resolution of the conflict by the Supreme Court may
become essential.
C. Union Discrimination
1. The Conflict within Section 8 (b)(1) (A): Granite State
During the Survey year a Supreme Court decision revealed further
movement toward resolution of a major question inherent in section
8 (b) (1) (A)." The main clause of 8 (b) (1) (A) protects employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7. A proviso qualifies
the main clause by prohibiting the clause from being applied to "impair
the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect
to the acquisition or retention of membership therein." 2 The potential
for conflict between the protection of section 7 rights and the preserva-
tion of union discipline inherent in 8 (b) (1) (A) was heightened by the
Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
41 Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 616, 51 L.R.R.M. 1110, 1111 (1962).
42 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970).
1
 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970) provides in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 157 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the
right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acqui-
sition or retention of membership therein . . . .
Section 7 of the NLRA provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organiza-
tion as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a) (3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1)(A) (1970). See note i supra.
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Co.,' which utilized the proviso in sanctioning disciplinary rules other
than exclusion and admission rules. Since union discipline inevitably
represents at least some degree of curtailment of employees' section 7
rights, the problem is to determine what kinds of discipline in what
kinds of circumstances can be imposed by a union within the limits of
section 8 (b) (1) (A).
In NLRB v. Textile Workers Local 1029 (Granite State),' the
Supreme Court held that, absent restraints on the resignation of mem-
bers in a union's constitution, bylasVs or contract with the employer,
a union violates section 8 (b) (1) (A) by fining individuals who had
resigned from the union before crossing a picket line and returning to
work during a lawful strike. The Court in Granite State displayed an
attitude more favorable to the individual employee's section 7 rights
than to what it termed the union's "pressures for conformity and sub-
mission to its regime." 8
The union commenced a lawful economic strike against the em-
ployer after a unanimous strike vote. The entire membership joined the
strike and voted, with one dissent, to fine strikebreaking members. Sub-
sequently, thirty-one employees resigned union membership and re-
turned to work. Although the union's constitution did not provide for
any restraint on resignation, the union imposed fines on the employees
and sought state court enforcement of the fines.' The employees charged
that these actions violated their section 7 right to refrain from striking
and constituted an 8 (b) (1) (A) unfair labor practice.'
The Board held8 that the union's imposition and attempted en-
forcement of fines based on postresignation conduct of members who
had resigned constituted a violation of section 8(b) (1) (A).° The First
a 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
4 — U.S.	 93 S. Ct. 385 (1972).
5 93 S. Ct. at 387.
o Id. at 386.
7 NLRB v. Textile Workers Local 1029, 446 F.2d 369, 370-71, 77 L.R.R.M. 2711,
2712-13 (1971).
8 Textile Workers Local 1029, 187 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 76 L.R.R.M. 1246 (1970).
9 The Board followed its 1970 decision in Booster Lodge 405, Machinists, 185 N.L.R.B.
No. 23, 75 L.R.R.M. 1004 (1970), enforced, 459 F.2d 1143, 79 L.R.R.M. 2443 (D.C. Cir.
1972), aff'd, 41 U.S.L.W. 4683 (U.S. May 21, 1973), in which it had ruled that discipline
could not be imposed on members who resigned before crossing picket fines, but that
discipline could be imposed on those who resigned only after crossing the lines. 75 L.R.R.M.
at 1006-07. In so deciding, the Board relied on the Supreme Court's statement in Scofield
v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969), summarizing the standards which must be met by union
rules: "[Section] 8(b) (1) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted rule which
reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor
laws, and is reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave the union
and escape the rule." Id. at 430 (emphasis added). The Board thus attempted to resolve an
issue which the Supreme Court expressly left open when, in Allis-Chalmers, it first approved
union fines against strikebreakers: whether 8(b) (1) (A) prohibits union discipline against
employees who have less than full membership in the union, 388 U.S. at 197.
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Circuit, in refusing to enforce the Board's order in Granite State,"
reasoned that the Supreme Court's finding in Allis-Chalmers that
" qt] he power to fine or expel strikebreakers is essential if the union
is to be an effective bargaining agent' "11
 necessitated approval of the
Granite State union's fines. The court emphasized that although the em-
ployees had resigned before returning to work, they had apparently
participated fully in the union's activities at the time the strike com-
menced. Pointing to the "mutual reliance . . . implicit in all strike
votes,"' 2
 the First Circuit ruled that "although § 7 gives an employee
the right to refuse to undertake and involve himself in union activities,
it does not necessarily give him the right to abandon these activities in
midcourse once he has undertaken them voluntarily.""
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision by an eight-to-
one majority, with Justice Blackmun dissenting.14 The Court apparently
did not give as much weight to the special needs of the union in its
role as bargaining agent as it had given this factor in Allis-Chalmers.15
Instead, the Court decided "to apply the law which normally is re-
flected in our free institutions—the right of the individual to join or
to resign from associations, as he sees fit .... 718 The Court noted that
its decision did not reach the issues which would be posed in a situation
where the contractual relationship between the union and its members
attempted to curtail the freedom to resign. 17
Justice Blackmun, dissenting, contended that the Court had
"exalt [ed] the formality of resignation over the substance of the
various interests and national labor policies at stake . . . ."" He urged
that "the three factors of a member's strike vote, his ratification of
strikebreaking penalties, and his actual participation in the strike"
might point to the existence of "an enforceable, voluntary obligation
on the part of an employee to refrain from strikebreaking activity."'
The Supreme Court's decision in Granite State is significant in that
it concludes that, at least absent contractual restrictions, the right to
refrain, as protected by section 7, must include the right to resign and
that such resignation ends an employee's duty to the union and the
union's corresponding right to discipline him. It is submitted that
10 NLRB v. Textile Workers Local 1029, 446 F.2d 369, 77 L.R.R.M. 2711 (1st Cir.
1971).
11 388 U.S. at 181.
12 446 F.2d at 372, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2714.
18 Id. at 373, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2714.	 •
14 93 S. Ct. at 385.
16 See 388 U.S. at 181.
16 93 S. Ct. at 387.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 389 (dissenting opinion).
10 Id. (dissenting opinion).
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there is considerable merit in the dissent's criticism of the majority's
reliance on the sole standard of membership. It is difficult to under-
stand why the fining of employees after termination of their member-
ship "results in restraint or coercion under § 8 (b) (1) (A), when the
imposition of fines for similar conduct by members, and their enforce-
ment in state courts, does not fall within that section's prohibition." 20
Section 7 rights are clearly involved both in the case of employees who
resign before crossing a picket line and in the case of those who do not
so resign. If the policy favoring union solidarity prevails over the policy
of protecting section 7 rights in the latter case, it should be given strong
consideration in the former. The bargaining representative's need for
solidarity should not, in any event, have been dismissed by the majority
as involving merely pressure for "conformity" and "submission" to a
"regime."21 It is further submitted that the Court, if it is in the future
called upon to resolve a case which involves facts similar to those in
Granite State, but which presents the additional factor of a contractual
provision restricting the right of resignation during a strike, should keep
strongly in mind that, as the Court recognized in Allis-Chalmers,
" `[t]he power to fine or expel strikebreakers is essential if the union
is to be an effective bargaining agent . . .
2. Fines against Supervisors: Illinois Bell Tel.
Although the Supreme Court has acted on numerous occasions to
define the limits of a union's ability to fine employees, it has not yet
applied the policies it has developed to the area of union fines against
supervisors" who are union members.' When a union fines a supervisor/
member, it must do so within the limits of section 8(b) (1) (B), 25 which
prohibits restraint or coercion of an employer's selection of its repre-
sentatives for bargaining or grievance adjustment.
In the Survey year a panel of the District of Columbia Circuit, in
IBEW v. NLRB (Illinois Bell Tel. Co.), 26
 moved toward a major
restriction of union disciplinary powers over supervisors. The court,
213 Id. (dissenting opinion).
21 Id. at 387.
22 388 U.S. at 181.
23 The term "supervisor" is defined in 29 .U.S.C. 1152(11) (1970). The NLRA's defi-
nition of "employee" excludes supervisors, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
24 Supervisors may become union members, but employers cannot be forced to treat
supervisor/members as employees for bargaining or other purposes. 29 U.S.C. § 164(a)
(1970).
25 Section 8(b) (1) (B) provides that "tilt shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents—(1) to restrain or coerce . . . (B) an employer in the
selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment
	
of grievances .	 ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (B) (1970).
	26 - F.2d	 81 L.R.R.M. 2257 (D.C. Cir. 1972). For a detailed discussion of Illinois
Bell Tel., see Note, 14 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 785 (1973).
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affirming the Board,' held that the discipline of supervisors for per-
forming rank-and-file work during a strike constitutes restraint and
coercion of an employer in violation of section 8(b) (1) (B). The union
had imposed $500 fines on foremen who crossed its picket lines to do
rank-and-file work during an economic strike. The employer had indi-
cated to the foremen that it preferred them to work during the strike,
although it did not require them to return to work.28
The majority of the court acknowledged that section 8 (b) (1) (B)
"only proscribes union interference for acts performed by a supervisor
relating to his supervisory or managerial duties."" The court found that
in spite of the fact that the actual work performed by the supervisors
was "rank-and-file work," their activity was of the type shielded from
discipline by section 8(b) (1) (B), since they undertook the work "to
enhance the bargaining position of their employer during a dispute
between it and the particular union involved.""
In a lengthy dissenting opinion Judge Wright contended that the
court's decision could only be explained as an acceptance by the major-
ity of the theory that all union fines of supervisor/members are per se
violative of section 8 (b) (1) (B) . 32 Judge Wright noted that the test em-
ployed by the majority—whether the supervisors' actions were under-
taken in the interests . of the employer—would have the effect of
prohibiting all discipline against supervisors, since "to the extent that
management and union are viewed as adversaries, it is always in man-
agement's interests for the supervisors to take actions which weaken the
union."" He further argued that the goal of allowing unions to protect
their status as bargaining agents through reasonable discipline of mem-
bers—a goal recognized by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Allis-
27 IBEW (Illinois Bell Tel. Co.), 192 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 77 L.R.R.M. 1610 (1971).
28 81 L.R.R.M. at 2258.
20 Id. at 2262-63 n.28.
80 Id at 2258.
al Id. at 2265. The majority attempted on two grounds to distinguish the instant case
from the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175
(1967), where the Court sanctioned union discipline against strikebreaking members. The
first ground advanced was that Allis-Chalmers involved § 8(b)(1)(A) which, unlike
§ 8(b) (1) (13), has a proviso protecting the right of unions to prescribe internal disciplinary
rules. 81 L.R.R.M. at 2263-64; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970). It would appear
that this ground is quite weak, since the Court in Allis-Chalmers expressly relied on the
"restrain or coerce" language common to both subsections of § 8(b) (1), rather than the
§ 8(b) (1)(A) proviso. See 388 U.S. at 179. The second ground advanced was that the
discipline in the instant case, unlike that in Allis-Chalmers, had an effect on parties ex-
ternal to the relationship between the union and its members. 81 L.R.R.M. at 2264. As
Judge Wright pointed out in his dissent, this ground is weak since "the union rule in
Allis-Chalmers had, and was intended to have, an external effect on the employer." Id. at
2277 (dissenting opinion).
32 81 L.R.R.M. at 2275.
33 Id. (emphasis in the original).
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Chalmers Manufacturing Co n4---applied with full force to the instant
case; he concluded that no justification could be advanced for allowing
supervisors to gain all the benefits of union membership without assum-
ing any of the duties of such membership."
It would appear that there is considerable merit in Judge Wright's
interpretation and criticism of the Illinois Bell Tel. majority's decision.
Although the majority admits that section 8(b) (1) (B) is only appli-
cable when supervisors are disciplined for actions related to managerial
functions, the majority's test—whether the actions further the employ-
er's interests—makes meaningless Congress' limitation of section
8(b) (1) (B) to "representatives for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing or the adjustment of grievances."3" Therefore, it may be concluded
that the Illinois Bell Tel. majority has construed too broadly the statu-
tory restrictions on union discipline and, in so doing, has unnecessarily
curtailed the right of unions to maintain solidarity through reason-
able discipline.
D. Secondary Boycotts
1. Common Situs Picketing
a. The Common Situs—Section 8(b) (4) of the NLRA protects
the neutral employer from suffering the effects of labor disputes between
other employers and their employees' while simultaneously preserving
to employees the right to strike against their own employers. 2 The task
of effecting this dual goal is complicated in that a lawful primary strike
has at least minimal secondary effects,' and any attempt to distinguish
with certainty between the incidental secondary effects which employees
hope will occur only in aid of their primary strike, and those which they
desire solely for their effect on the secondary employer, leads into an
area of speculation where even sophisticated philosophers and psycholo-
84 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
8a 81 L.R.R.M. at 2278-79.
26 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (B) (1970) (emphasis added).
1 This goal is evinced in the language of § 8(b) (4) (ii) (B), which provides that it
shall be an unfair labor practice
to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an in-
dustry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is ... forcing
or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting or other-
wise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer,
or to cease doing business with any other person . . . .
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (ii) (13) (1970).
2 "Congress did not seek, by § 8(b) (4), to interfere with the ordinary strike . . . .11
NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 672 (1951).
8 "The objectives of any picketing include a desire to influence others from with-
holding from the employer their services or trade." Electrical Workers Local 761 v.
NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 673 (1961).
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gists must fear to tread.4
 The difficulties inherent in the general second-
ary boycott area are exacerbated when the specific problem involves
common situs picketing—the situation in which the employer being
lawfully picketed and one or more neutral employers work at the same
location. Of necessity, the incidence of secondary effects in this situation
is heightened.
In Sailors Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Docks the Board ad-
dressed the problem of common situs picketing. The Board held that
common situs picketing is primary provided that it: is strictly limited to
times when the situs is being used in common and the primary employer
is engaged in its normal business; is limited to the immediate vicinity of
the situs; and clearly discloses that the dispute is with the primary
employer.
These Dry Dock standards are not difficult to apply; the difficult
question which has perpetuated the unsettlement in the area of common
situs picketing concerns the precise effect of compliance or non-com-
pliance with the standards. The Board believes that compliance or non-
compliance with the Dry Dock tests is evidence, not conclusive evidence,
of the primary or secondary nature of strike activity.'
A case decided this Survey year reaffirms the Board's policy of us-
ing the Dry Dock tests as an important evidentiary tool rather than
applying them as an absolute. A dissent, relying heavily on two Supreme
Court cases which had put the Board's use of the Dry Dock tests into
doubt, indicates, however, that the Board is presently divided on appli-
4 It is, of course, somewhat naive to expect anyone to delineate with precision
the philosophical difference between a man's hope and his desire, or the
psychological difference between a man's informed wish and his intent.
Pushed to the extreme, the whole notion of distinguishing between primary
and secondary activity runs up against the premise of the law that a man
intends the known and probable consequences of his actions. If this principle
were applied in determining section 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) violations, the
Act's attempt to distinguish between primary and secondary activity would
abort.
Local 480, IBEW v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 1085, 1091, 70 L.R.R.M. 3339, 3344 (1969).
5 92 N.L.R.B. 547, 27 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1950).
6 The Dry Dock standards "are not to be applied on an indiscriminate 'per se' basis,
but are to be regarded merely as aids in determining the underlying question of statutory
violations." Local 861, IBEW, 135 N.L.R.B. 250, 49 L.R.R.M. 1446 (1962). Deviation
from the Dry Dock standards does not automatically translate into an unfair labor prac-
tice. Local 3, IBEW, 144 N.L.R.B. 1089, 1093, 54 L.R.R.M. 1178, 1180 (1963), although
flagrant departure can be the basis for an unfair labor practice charge even if the union's
picketing has a clearly primary objective. Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Local 519 v. NLRB,
416 F.2d 1120, 70 L.R.R.M. 3300 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Furthermore, mere compliance with
the Dry Dock standards will not automatically clothe employees' activity with lawfulness
if there are other indicia of the intended secondary nature of that activity. See NLRB
v. District Council of Hod Carriers, 389 F.2d 721, 725, 67 L.R.R.M. 2502 (9th Cir.
1968).
1230
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW •
cation of the tests. In Teamsters Local 126 (Ready Mixed Concrete),?
the Teamsters, as the result of a feud between one of its officers and the
manager of Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. (RMC) deliberately and ad-
mittedly8
 endeavored to put RMC out of business. As part of this cam-
paign, the Teamsters picketed at construction sites where the company
supplied concrete.' Although it would have been possible to do so, the
union did not picket at RMC's headquarters."
In picketing the delivery sites, the Teamsters adhered to the letter
of the Dry Dock standards. On this basis, the Trial Examiner found that
the picket was primary, and that no 8 (b) (4) violation had occurred.
However, a three-to-two majority of the Board held that the union
violated section 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B), compliance with the Dry
Dock standards notwithstanding. "Moore Dry Dock," the majority
stated, "does not establish a formula whereby picketing with a
secondary object can be done lawfully. Rather, it simply establishes
[an] evidentiary aid for the Board to determine the object of picketing
where the other evidence is equivocal. The Board is not bound by the
inference of lawfulness from compliance with the Moore Dry Dock
standards.'" 1
In Ready Mixed Concrete, a number of circumstances supported
the Board's decision that application of Dry Dock so as to exculpate
the union from an unfair labor practice charge would be inequitable.
The Teamsters' behavior was openly lacking in manifestations of
good-faith primary picketing: the vendetta against RMC was ad-
mitted; no picketing took place at RMC's home base; picketing was
not limited to points of ingress and egress at the construction sites
where RMC deliverymen were working, but was carried out along
the full frontage of the sites.' 2 Far from minimizing the effect of its
boycott upon the neutral employer, the union, despite all protestations
of primary activity, appeared to be making the secondary employer a
target. Thus, the decision in Ready Mixed Concrete is a reaffirmation
of the Board's intention carefully to balance the equities—including,
but not limited to, compliance with the Moore Dry Dock tests—of each
individual common situs case, in order best to effectuate the Act's ob-
ject of simultaneously protecting both the employees' right to strike, and
the neutral employer's right to remain unaffected and uninvolved.
Stressing that they did not condone the union's behavior, Members
7 200 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 81 L.R.R.M. 1461 (1972).
81 L.R.R.M. at 1466.
9 Id. at 1463.
10 Id. at 1463, 1466.
11 Id. at 1465,
12 Id. at 1466.
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Fanning and Jenkins dissented. The majority, the dissenters contended,
made a correct factual assessment of the Ready Mixed Concrete situa-
tion, but came to an erroneous legal conclusion. The Supreme Court's
decisions in Electrical Workers Local 761 (General Electric Co.) . v.
NLRB" and United Steelworkers (Carrier Corp.) v. NLRB" were
seen by the dissent as having shifted the stress in analysis of common
situs picketing cases. This shift was seen to be from concentration on
whether the purpose of the picketing was to appeal to the employees of
secondary employers, to focus instead upon the relation of the work
tasks performed by the secondary employees to those performed by
the primary employees and the nature of the appeal to the secondary
employees. In Ready Mixed Concrete, there was a direct appeal to
secondary employees. However, the work of these employees (receipt
and unloading of concrete) was inextricably involved with the everyday
functions of RMC, and the appeal to them could arguably have been
merely to induce them to respect the union's primary picketing of RMC.
From this vantage point, the dissent would view the union's compliance
with the Dry Dock standards as establishing its activity as a lawful
primary picket." Equally, from this vantage point, the majority's
continued stress upon purpose as the key concept involved in assess-
ment of the common situs boycott situation and concomitant failure to
analyze the relationship of the primary and secondary employees in
terms of work tasks performed, seems to the dissent to be an abdication
of responsible administrative analysis.
The dissent seems to feel that the majority, carried away by offen-
sive elements of the fact situation, made a policy decision and .then
distorted the law to accommodate it.r It is submitted that policy deci-
sions are not only appropriate to, but are perhaps at the very heart of,
the secondary boycott area, and that the majority's decision was well
within the scope of both the statutory and the case law in this area, both
of which have been consciously kept flexible." The Supreme Court's
emphasis in General Electric and Carrier Corp. upon the type of work
being performed was tailored to the reserved-gate situation: i.e., a situ-
ation in which an employer has consciously set aside specific gates to
be used by specifically designated employees, so that any picketing at
such gates will be clearly identifiable as directed toward the employees
for whose use the gates were earmarked. Ready Mixed Concrete, how-
ever, did not involve the reserved-gate situation. Thus, it is difficult to
find the majority of the Board in derogation of its decisional duty by
18 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
14 376 U.S. 492 (1964).
15 81 L.R.R.M. at 1469.
16 Id. at 1467-68.
17 See discussion in note 6 supra.
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virtue of having failed to apply a test which evolved out of the Supreme
Court's desire to mitigate the harshness of having the finding of a sec-
tion 8(b) (4) violation rest solely on the location of picketing.
The Dry Dock tests and the General Electric shift in emphasis are
equally viable interpretations of 8 (b) (4), each the result of a good
faith effort to import the maximum of order with the minimum of arbi-
trariness into an area that is of necessity confusing. That the majority
is just that—a majority—indicates that for the time being the Dry
Dock standards will continue to be the Board's guide when assessing the
nature of a common situs picket. That two members dissent is an indica-
tion that a shift toward emphasis on work task relationship, as de-
veloped in General Electric and Carrier Corp., is a possibility for the
Board in the near future.
b. The One-Product Rule—Another aspect of the common situs
problem received attention during the Survey year. The Ninth Circuit
enforced the Board's determination that a union violated section
8 (b) (4) when it picketed and distributed handbills urging consumers
not to buy homes which were the sole product of a secondary em-
ployer?
In 1964, the Supreme Court decided NLRB v. Fruit Packers Local
760 (Tree Fruits).1° In this case, the "common situs" was a retail
supermarket. The union had a dispute with fruit packers and ware-
housemen doing business in Washington. As a tactic, the union insti-
tuted a consumer boycott against Washington State apples. Conse-
quently, union pickets marched at customer entrances to a store which
sold non-union apples, carrying signs which specified that the dispute
was not with the supermarket but with the apples being sold in it.
Pickets were explicitly instructed not to request any consumers to
cease dealing with the store; they were to limit their discouragements
strictly to purchase of Washington State apples." Noting that "Con-
gress has never adopted a broad condemnation of peaceful picketing" 2'
the Court distinguished the situation in which consumer picketing is
employed to persuade customers to cease all trading with an employer
from that in which customers are urged merely to avoid purchase of
one of an employer's many wares, and held that the latter was not a
secondary boycott within the ban of action 8 (b) (4). 22 "In [the former
type of] case," said the Court, "the union does more than merely follow
18 Hoffman v. Cment Masons Local 337, — F.2d 	 81 L.R.R.M. 2641 (9th Cir.
1972).
18 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
20 Id. at 60-61.
21 Id. at 71.
22 Id. at 71-72.
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the struck product; it creates a separate dispute with the secondary em-
ployer."23
Hoffman v. Cement Masons Local 33724 also presented a situation
in which a union picketed to persuade the public to boycott a product
being sold by an employer who was himself not involved with the
union. The union struck a general contractor which built homes in a
subdivision. These homes were owned and sold by Shuler, a stranger to
the dispute between the union and the contractor. The union picketed
and distributed handbills at the sole entrance to the construction site.
The words "General Contractor" appeared on both the signs and the
handbills; so, however, did the words "Please do not purchase these
homes."" The Ninth Circuit enforced the Board's decision that the
union's activity at the subdivision constituted a secondary boycott and
thus violated section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the NLRA.
In Tree Fruits the Supreme Court made it clear that peaceful
picketing to eliminate all commerce with a secondary employer unless
it ceases dealing with the struck primary employer is prohibited
under the proviso of section 8(b) (4).20 Hoffman is precisely such
a case. To request that consumers buy no homes was of necessity to
request that they have no dealings with Shuler and thus such request
could not but be a secondary boycott.
The Hof man decision is not a logical candidate for warm recep-
tion by construction unions. The holding effectively forecloses picketing
in a situation which seems to arise frequently in the construction con-
text;" the sole product situation arises but sporadically in most other
businesses—it is a rare clothing store that sells but one label, a rare
grocer who sells only apples. Nevertheless the decision seems fair. Had
23 Id. at 72.
24	 F.2d —, 81 L.R.R.M. 2641 (9th Cir. 1972).
25 81 L.R.R.M. at 2642.
20 377 U.S. at 70-72.
27 Construction unions have been unsuccessful in obtaining special treatment that
might obviate perceived harsh treatment under present law. Prior to this decision, the
Supreme Court held that a strike to force a general contractor on a construction project
to terminate its dealings with a subcontractor who dealt with the striking union was an
unfair labor practice under § 8(b) (4)(a). NLRB v. Denver Bldg.. & Constr. Trades
Council, 341 U.S. 675, 689 (1951). The Fifth Circuit then held that the construction
industry was subject, in a situation involving reserved-gate picketing, to the Dry Dock
tests. Markwell & Hartz, Inc. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 79, 83, 66 L.R.R.M. 2712 (5th Cir.
1967). This decision quashed the hopes of construction unions-that the Supreme Court's
General Electric holding that reserved-gate picketing was lawful if the subcontractor's
employees using that gate were engaged in work necessary to the normal operations of
the general contractor might be seen as overruling, sub silentio, the Denver case. Point-
ing out that "Denver is cited with approval in General Electric," id. at 83, 66 L.R.R.M.
at 2715, the court in Markwell & Hartz cited Denver for authority that the subcontractor
and the contractor on a construction project are not allied, but are separate business
entities, neither of whose functions at the common situs are likely to be part and parcel
of the normal operations of the owner. Id.
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the minority prevailed, a number of neutral employers would have been
enmeshed in quarrels not their own, the very result sought to be avoided
by the 8(b) (4) ban on secondary boycotts." However, it can also be
seen that a decision such as Hoffman, albeit objectively fair, is perhaps
harsh on unions in the construction industry. It is submitted that an
objective, equal-treatment-for-all-industries approach in the common
situs picketing area is equal more in theory than in practice.
2. Hot Cargo Clauses
The Survey year saw continuation of tension between the Board
and the courts in regard to the interpretation of the section 8(e) hot
cargo provision' and its effect upon the secondary boycott area.
Section 8(e) was adopted to supplement the section 8 (b) (4) ban
on secondary boycotts." Under section 8(e), contractual agreements
not to handle goods of employers not party to the contract are unen-
forceable; the boycott of a neutral employer that could not, under
section 8(b) (4), be accomplished by picketing, also can not be accom-
plished by contract.B1 The statutory provision itself carves out excep-
tions for contracts relating to work done at a construction site and for
the clothing industry." In 1967, the Supreme Court added another.
In National Woodwork Manufacturers Association v. NLRB," the
Court held that a contract clause designed to protect or preserve work
which was traditionally handled by the union's members violated
neither section 8(e) nor section 8(b) (4)."
The Woodwork decision marked the beginning of a breach between
the Board and the courts that presently shows little sign of healing.
Prior to Woodwork, the Board and many of the courts of appeals found
hot cargo clauses unlawful, work preservation aspects notwithstand-
ing." Since 1967, the courts have followed Woodwork and have held
28 IBEW v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 25 L.R.R.M. 2449 (2d Cir. 1950).
29 This section provides, in pertinent part, that
(e) pit shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and
any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied,
whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from
handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products
of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and
any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such
an agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible and void ... .
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970).
80 For an excellent discussion, see the majority opinion in National Woodwork
Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 619-44 (1967).
31 Id. at 634.
32 29 U.S.C. * 158(e) (1970) (proviso clauses).
88 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
31 Id. at 644-46. See also the companion case of Insulation Contractors Ass'n v.
NLRB, 386 U.S. 664 (1967).
35 See, e.g., Plumbers Local 5 (Arthur Venneri Co.), 137 N.L.R.B. 828, 50
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exempt from section 8(e) sanctions a "hot cargo" clause which has the
demonstrable purpose of preserving for union members work which has
traditionally been theirs." The Board, however, has continued to use its
own "right of control" test, which it had formulated and applied before
Woodwork. This test does not contradict the Woodwork analysis of hot
cargo clauses. Rather, it goes a step beyond Woodwork—which, it is
important to note, specifically left the "right of control" situation an
open question." Since 8(e) was enacted to "plug [a] gap" left by 8(b)
(4) 38 and because the Board reasons that "the key consideration in any
determination in this 8(b) (4) (B) area then is whether the pressured
employer is truly the primary with whom the union had its dispute or
whether, in the particular circumstances of the particular case, the
pressured employer was a neutral to the dispute,' the Board looks
first to see if the clause can indeed be termed a work preservation
clause; if so, the Board then inquires whether the pressured primary
employer can award the work. If the employer has no authority to grant
the work, then the Board deduces that the pressure upon such em-
ployer must necessarily have the object of producing a result else-
where; i.e., must be secondary. The "right to control" test is, then,
harsher than the Court's Woodwork test, for, under the right to control
test, contract clauses which courts of appeals would find to be enforce-
able work preservation clauses may still be found unenforceable as
violative of 8 (b) (4) (B), if the primary employer does not have the
right to control the assignment of the work.
Within the Survey year, the Board manifested its unwillingness to
relinquish the right of control approach, despite the equally tenacious
unwillingness of the circuits, in light of the Woodwork decision, to
use it.4° However, the Board introduced a potentially conciliatory note
into its adamance, offering the courts a chance to recognize that they
L.R.R.M. 1266 (1962), enforced as modified, 321 F.2d 366, 53 L.R.R.M. 2424 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 921 (1963); Longshoremen's Local 1694, 137 N.L.R.B. 1178,
50 L.R.R.M. 1333 (1962), enforced as modified, 331 F.2d 712, 56 L.R.R.M. 2200 (3d
Cir. 1964); Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist. Council, 144 N.L.R.B. 91, 54 L.R.R.M. 1003
(1963), enforced, 339 F.2d 142, 57 L.R.R.M. 2509 (6th Cir. 1964).
88 See Plumbers Union (Koch Sons, Inc.), 201 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 82 L.R.R.M. 1113,
1118 n.29 (1973), where examples are collected.
87 386 U.S. at 616-17 n.3.
38 National Woodworkers Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 634 (1967).
39 82 L.R.R.M. at 1116.
49 See NLRB v. Local 164, IBEW, 388 F.2d 105, 67 L.R.R.M. 2352 (3d Cir. 1968);
Plumbers Local 636 v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 906, 74 L.R.R.M. 2851 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
American Boiler Mfg. Ass'n v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 556, 69 L.R.R.M. 2858 (8th Cir. 1968).
In Teamsters Local 216 (Bigge Drainage Co.), 198 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 81 L.R.R.M.
1113 (1972), the Board found a § 8(e) violation without having to reach application of
the right of control test. The contract clause referred to work which the unionized sub-
contractor had never performed. Thus, the Board found an unlawful hot cargo agree-
ment directly under Woodwork.
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have not so much opposed the Board as merely "misunderstood" it. In
Plumbers Union (Koch Sons, Inc.) 41
 the locals which represented the
subcontractor's employees refused to allow them to install prefabri-
cated pipe manufactured and supplied by the prime contractor because
the pipe had not been cut, threaded and fit by union members. As part
of its agreement with the prime contractor (Koch), the subcontractor
(Phillips) had agreed to install pipe prefabricated at Koch's plant.
The Board had no trouble finding a legitimate work preservation
clause and motive." Nevertheless, it did not find Woodwork control-
ling. A crucial distinguishing factor existed: the work sought by the
union was not within Phillips' power to award. Therefore, pressure
exerted upon Phillips could not have possibly resulted in a direct
assignment of the work; what it could do was coerce Phillips into
ceasing all dealings with Koch. The Board found this to be a secondary
boycott in violation of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B). 42
Similarly, in Carpenters Local 742 v. NLRB (.1.L. Simmons
Co.)" the Board, on remand from the District of Columbia Circuit,
found an 8(b) (4) violation in a union's refusal to allow carpenters
to install doors ordered from an outside manufacturer. The contract
between a hospital and the general contractor specified installation of
premachined, plastic-faced doors that would carry a guarantee for the
life of the building. The union protested that use of the doors ordered
in satisfaction of the contract would deprive the carpenters of on-the-
jobsite work usually available to them, and insisted that the prefabri-
cated doors be replaced by unfinished doors that would be fitted and
prepared at the jobsite. The Board noted that such doors could not
satisfy the contractual requirement in that they would not be plastic-
faced. Consequently, use of them would nullify the liftetime guarantee.
Therefore, the Board held that the carpenter's employer was not au-
thorized to assign the work to the carpenters at the jobsite, and that
the union-urged refusal to install the prefabricated doors was a second-
ary boycott." The D.C. Circuit, unable to accept what it viewed as an
indiscriminate per se application of the right of control test, remanded
the case for further consideration." The Board reaffirmed its initial
order." In accordance with the court's mandate, the Board did not
ground its order solely on application of the right of control test. In-
41 201 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 82 L.R.R.M 1113 (1973).
42 82 L.R.R.M. at 1117.
42 Id. at 1117-19.
44 201 N.L.R.B, No. 8, 82 L.R.R.M. 1119 (1973).
45 178 N.L.R.B. 351, 72 L.R.R.M. 1107 (1969).
46 Carpenters Local 742 v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 895, 76 L.R.R.M. 2979 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 986 (1971).
47 201 N.L.R.B. No. 8, 82 L.R.R.M. 1119 (1973).
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stead, it first applied the right of control test and then reviewed the
record to find several points on which it might question the legitimacy
of the work preservation nature of the union's demands." It is evi-
dent that the Board's deference to the court was merely superficial;
the Board in fact again applied its own test, with a desultory nod in
the direction of the court's standards.
The profile of hot cargo/secondary boycott cases since the Su-
preme Court's decision in Woodwork, particularly the I.L. Simmons
litigation, leaves little doubt that there is a court-Board dispute regard-
ing section 8(e) as accommodated to the section 8(b) (4) ban on
secondary boycotts. It is equally apparent that both sides intend to
remain adamant. To complicate the issue, each interpretation seems
grounded in a substantial foundation of logic and fairness. The court
theory presents an exception to the hot cargo ban which is easily ap-
plied and demonstrably consistent with the congressional intention in
enacting section 8(e)." On the other hand, the reasoning underlying
the Board's curtailment of the work preservation exception is difficult
to fault: surely an employer cannot be pressured to do what he has
neither ability nor authority to do, with any good-faith expectation
that such pressure will bring about direct, primary results.
Lest the Board and courts seem to be at a stalemate breakable
only by the Supreme Court, it must be noted that the Koch case con-
tains language which supplies the courts with a graceful "out." The
Board prefaces a careful discussion of its right of control approach
with the declaration:
We have already stated our respectful disagreement
with those circuit court decisions [rejecting the Board's ap-
proach], but we would be remiss in not admitting that cer-
tain of those courts' problems with the Board's approach in
this area may well have occurred because of the Board's lack
of full explication of its rationale for decision in its more re-
cent decisions."
Whether this apologeia and the attendant explication will precipitate
48 [E]vidence as to a primary work preservation objective seems scant. It is
doubtful, first of all, whether the objective can fairly be called work "preserva-
tion" at all There is no direct evidence that plastic-clad doors have ever, much
less traditionally, been installed in this area by the Respondent's members. All
the record shows in this connection is an unsupported assertion by Business Rep-
resentative Foreman during a discussion that the type of work in issue had once
been performed [at another facility in the area].
82 L.R.R.M. at 1121.
48 See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 633-42 (1967),
concerning the congressional intent.
88 82 L.R.R.M. at 1118.
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modification of the court's view remains to be seen. If it does not, it
may be that any further clarification in this area will have to come
from Congress or the Supreme Court.
3. Third
-Party Standing under Section 303(6): Milner
During the Survey year, the implementation of section 303 (b)
of the LMRA51
 progressed as the Fifth Circuit decided that the sales
representative of a primary employer, having been economically in-
jured by the unlawful secondary strike activities of three unions, had
standing to bring an action for damages thereunder.
Section 303 (b) provides that "whoever shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of any" violation of section 8(b) (4)
may bring suit in federal court "and shall recover the damages by him
sustained and the cost of the sult." 52 The statutory language is broad
—untenably so, seemed to be the consensus of opinions of the courts,
which, assuming that Congress intended some limit on standing to
sue under this section, attempted to delineate those limits. The Sixth
Circuit, in United Brick Workers v. Deena Artware,53 held that pri-
mary as well as neutral employers can have standing under section
303 (b) ; in UMW v. Osborne Mining Co.,54 another Sixth Circuit de-
cision, it was held that third parties—neither primary nor neutral
employers—do not have standing. In Osborne, the plaintiff was a coal
sales agency selling on commission under terms of a contract with the
primary employer. Although its commissions were arguably reduced
by the defendant's illegal secondary boycott of the company with
which it had contracted, the court held that the plaintiff's damages
were incidental, and, therefore, were an insufficient basis for standing
under section 303 (b)."
The harshness of the Osborne holding soon appeared to be bal-
anced by the relative ease with which it could be distinguished. In
Gilchrist v. UMW" the Sixth Circuit allowed a third party to bring a
section 303 action. Here, the third party was an instrumentality under
control of the primary employer, a partnership; the court found them
to be constructively a single entity, and thus distinguishable from the
conventional agency relationship presented in Osborne. The direct re-
sult of the Gilchrist decision was to cloud the Sixth Circuit's interpre-
tation of section 303; although standing could have been based solely
51 29 U.S.C.	 187(b) (1970).
62 Id.
53 198 F.2d 637, 643-44, 30 L.R.R.M. 2485, 2490-91 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
897 (1952).
54 279 F.2d 716, 729-30, 46 L.R.R.M. 2380, 2387-89 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
881 (1960).
55 279 F.2d at 729, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2380.
5° 303 F.2d 73, 75-76, 50 L.R.R.M. 2198, 2200-01 (6th Cir. 1962).
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on the peculiar nature of the partnership-instrumentality relationship,
there was also room for argument that the court had based its decision
upon the plaintiff-instrumentality's direct, rather than merely inci-
dental, injury." Two subsequent cases—Wells v. Engineers Local
181" and Pennsylvania R.R. v. NMU5° gave support to the direct
injury interpretation, the former granting section 303 standing to
individual employees of the primary employer injured by an unlawful
secondary boycott, the latter to the railroad which owned premises
which were leased by a neutral employer and which formed the site
of the secondary activity.
Somewhere between the seemingly all-inclusive language of sec-
tion 303 (b) itself and the seemingly absolute preclusion of third-party
plaintiffs enunciated in Osborne there lies a criterion by which some
third-party claimants will be granted standing and others will be de-
nied it. The question of what that criterion is has not been decisively
answered. An amalgam of the Gilchrist, Wells and Pennsylvania R.R.
cases would imply that a third party has section 303 (b) standing if it
is the alter ego of either the neutral or the primary employer, has suf-
fered direct property injury from the secondary activity, or both.
This year, the Fifth Circuit—which in 1970 adopted the Gilchrist
"alter-ego" standard in Abbott v. Plumbers Local 142°°—added a new
test to those just mentioned. The facts in Milner & Co. v. Local 349,
IBEW61
 were similar to those presented by Osborne. Here, the plain-
tiff had a contract with the primary employer (Southwire) under
which it held the exclusive rights to sell Southwire's products within
a given district. When, at the urging of the defendant unions, a num-
ber of electricians ceased using Southwire wire products, Milner, the sole
Southwire representative, lost a number of commissions. Milner sued
under section 303 (b) for recovery of the commissions; the district
court, finding Osborne directly on point, dismissed the case. 62 The
Fifth Circuit, making no decision on the merits, reversed and re-
manded. The court rested its decision on several grounds. One signifi-
cant basis was the court's assertion that the "Gilchrist line of cases,"
while setting forth certain circumstances in which a third party might
be granted standing under section 303, was not to be taken as limiting
the possibilities to these circumstances alone." The court also
97 See Milner & Co. v. Local 349, IBEW, — F.2d —, 82 L.R.R.M. 2977, 2979 (5th
Cir. 1973).
58
 303 F.2d 73, 75-76, 50 L.R.R.M. 2198, 2200-01 (6th Cir. 1962).
59 206 F. Supp. 797, 50 L.R.R.M. 2659 (ED. Pa. 1962).
429 F.2d 786, 74 L.R.R.M. 2879 (5th Cir. 1970). The facts in Abbot were sub-
stantially similar to those in Gilchrist.
F.2d —, 82 L.R.R.M. 2977 (5th Cir. 1973).
62 341 F. Supp. 151, 155, 80 L.R.R.M. 3036, 3039 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
03
 82 L.R.R.M. at 2979.
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grounded the decision on its assertion that each third-party suit under
section 303 necessarily must involve a policy determination as to
whether, on the specific facts, the plaintiff ought to recover damages.
Here, the court found that policy reasons militated in favor of Milner's
being allowed to bring its action. Because of the close financial inter-
relationship of Milner and Southwire, not only would any secondary
boycott of Southwire stand to injure Milner, but this result would
necessarily be foreseeable by the union. This being so, the court rea-
soned, legitimate union interests would not in any way be endangered
by granting standing to Milner. They might be so endangered, how-
ever, were section 303 (b) relief opened to all persons who suffered
any injury whatsoever as a result of a secondary boycott. Thus, the
Fifth Circuit added a new test to those emerging from the "Gilchrist
line of cases":" if the financial fortunes of a third party and the pri-
mary employer are closely intertwined, to the extent that a secondary
boycott levelled against the latter is substantially certain to injure
the former; if such fact must have been reasonably foreseeable by the
union, thus giving rise to a fair inference that injury to the third party
was in fact contemplated by the union as part of the secondary boy-
cott of the primary employer; and if a grant of standing in all similar
situations would not be seen as a threat to legitimate union interests,
then the third party has standing to sue for damages under section
303 (b).
A concurring opinion in Milner sees the standards for third-party
standing under section 303 as unsatisfactorily intangible, and there-
fore would welcome an emendation—but it sees the majority's attempt
as failing to improve on the status quo. "The difficulty is that I am
unable to understand what standard is being proposed. The majority
opinion mentions 'line of fire,' foreseeability of consequences, and
threatening or undermining legitimate union interests. . . . I am un-
able to perceive with assurance what is the test of § 303 (b) liability
proposed in the majority opinion." 65
It is submitted that the concurring judge, while perhaps techni-
cally correct in his assessment of the majority's test as being no clearer
than those already extant, manifests undue optimism in assuming that
clear delineation of a single incisive standard is actually a possibility.
Both section 303 (b) and the Osborne opinion are clear in their man-
dates, and yet both have, in their respective absoluteness, been rejected
—the statute as overly broad (and therefore as not meant by Congress
to be interpreted literally), and Osborne as excessively restrictive.
The Milner majority was not attempting to supplant the set of circum-
64 Id. at 2980.
ea Id. at 2981 (concurring opinion) (footnotes omitted).
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stances, enumerated in the Gilchrist line of cases, under which a third
party has section. 303 standing. Rather, recognizing these cases as
stages in an ongoing attempt to find the happy medium between total
inclusion and total exclusion of third parties," the majority here added
another circumstance to be considered by courts. It is further sub-
mitted that, if the circuits continue in such a case-by-case implementa-
tion of section 303 (b), an equilibrium will be reached: there are a
finite number of circumstances under which a party other than the
neutral or the primary employer injured through a secondary boycott
will bring a section 303 (b) action. In the course of the courts' ad hoc
treatment, every paradigm will generate its own rule—to be known,
if no other way, by the name of the lead case. Successive cases, then,
will fall under one of the several rules, and courts will recognize with
relative ease a "Milner-type" case, a "Gilchrist -type" case, etc. Thus,
later if not sooner, the doubts voiced by the Milner concurrer will be
put to rest—if not in the most expedient manner, at least arguably in
the manner most expedient under the circumstances.
E. Recognitional Picketing: Claremont
Section 7 of the NLRA1 gives employees the right to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid and protection, and
section 8(a) (1) 2 makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
interfere with the exercise of these rights. However, not all group ac-
tivity on the part of employees is concerted activity within the protec-
tion of section 7. In Claremont Polychemical Corp.,3 the majority of a
panel of the Board held that employees who participated in picketing
for recognition in violation of section 8(b) (7) (B) 4 were engaged in un-
88 Id. at 2979-80.
1 29 U.S.C, § 157 (1970) provides in part: "Employees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . ."
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970) provides: "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer—(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title . . . ."
8 196 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 80 L.R.R.M. 1130 (1972). This case involves several distinct
issues and holdings. This discussion is limited to the issue of the denial of reinstatement.
4 29 U.S.C. 158(b) (7)(B) (1970) provides in part:
(b) It shall • be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
(7) to picket . . . any employer where an object thereof is forcing or re-
quiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the
representative of his employees . • . unless such labor organization is currently
certified as the representative of such employees: .
(B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid election'under sec-
tion 59(c) of this title has been conducted . . . .
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protected activity and, therefore, the employer was justified in refusing
to reinstate them, even though at the time of the picketing they were
participating in a lawful economic strike and the employer had not
hired permanent replacements.' Member Fanning dissented. In his
view section 8(b) (7) (B) is aimed solely at labor organizations and
should not be interpreted as if it carries an employee penalty as well.'
The dispute arose out of a campaign by Teamsters Local 707 to
organize a unit in which a valid election had been conducted in March
1969, at which time no representative was elected. In October of that
year the union requested recognition on the basis of authorization
cards which it had obtained from a majority of the employees. When
the employer failed to reply the employees struck and picketed with
signs stating that the employer "refuses to recognize Local 707." In
November the strikers unconditionally offered to return to work, but
the employer refused reinstatement. In its complaint the union
charged, inter alia, that the employer violated the Act by refusing to
reinstate the strikers.'
The administrative law judge found that the picketing was at
least partially recognitional and, therefore, was a violation of section
8(b) (7) (B) notwithstanding any unfair labor practices which the
employer may have committed. Further, he found that the strike was
a lawful economic strike, but that those strikers who picketed were
engaged in unprotected activity and therefore were not entitled to re-
instatement.' He based the latter conclusion on a line of cases holding,
or incorporating the principle by dicta, that an employee who partici-
pates in activity which contravenes the policies of the Act may be held
to have forfeited his right to invoke the other provisions of the Act to
restore him to his job.°
The majority adopted the administrative law judge's conclusions.
Member Fanning dissented. He argued that the majority was ignoring
and acting inconsistently with section 13 10 by interpreting section 8(b)
(7) (B) as if it contained a specific provision withdrawing employee
status from picketing strikers. Had Congress intended to achieve that
result, he stated, it had only to use the same language as was used in
5 80 L.R.R.M. at 1137.
6 Id. at 1141 (dissenting opinion).
7 This statement of facts is drawn from 80 L.R.R.M. at 1132.
8 Id. at 1135.
9 See cases collected in id. at 1134-35.
19 29 U.S.C. g 163 (1970) provides: "Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifi-
cally provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on
that right."
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the last provision of section 8(d), 11 which deprives employees engag-
ing in illegal strikes of their status as employees." The majority, in
response, justifiably noted that it held unprotected only the act of
picketing and not the strike, as was evidenced by its order requiring
that two employees who struck but did not picket be reinstated." In
addition, the majority pointed out that the legislative history reveals
that, by retaining the limitations or qualifications on the right to strike
which existed at the time of its enactment, section 13 has preserved
the power of the Board to deny remedies to employees - who have en-
gaged in illegal acts, or have struck for illegal objects?'
The holding that the Board has the authority to deny a remedy
to an employee who engaged in picketing in violation of Section 8(b)
(7) (B) is supported by the legislative history." In fact, it appears
that the Board has authority to deny a remedy to an employee who
has engaged in any activity which constitutes an unfair labor prac-
tice or is contrary to the policies of the Act." However, in view of the
highly technical nature of many violations and in view of the harshness
of the penalty imposed upon the individual worker, it is submitted that
this authority should be sparingly exercised." The burden imposed on
the individual by forcing him to predict the permissibility of the con-
certed activity and to risk his job on the correctness of that prediction
will inevitably have a chilling effect on the free exercise of section 7
rights. Furthermore, in determining whether a reinstatement order
would, in fact, contravene the policies of the Act, the Board should,
as Member Fanning suggests," give weight to all the circumstances
of the case. In view of the facts in Claremont, involving a technical vio-
lation of the Act by employees who were engaged in a lawful strike and
the commission of several unfair labor practices by the employer, a
reinstatement order would appear to be warranted.
11 29 U.S.C. I 158(d) (1970) provides in part: "Any employee who engages in a
strike within the sixty-day period ... shall lose his status as an employee of the em-
ployer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for the purposes of sections 158 to 160
of this title . . . ."
12 80 L.R.R.M. at 1141-42 (dissenting opinion).
Is Id. at 1137.
14 Id. at 1138.
15 S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1947) ; H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 38-41, 58-59 (1947).
16 Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 Ind. L.J. 319, 325 (1951);
Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1195, 1210 (1967).
17 See Schatski, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer—"Pro-
tected" Concerted Activities, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 378 (1969), where it is argued that em-
ployees should never be terminated for engaging in concerted activity unless they know
or should know that their conduct is illegal.
15 80 L.R.R.M. at 1143 (dissenting opinion).
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F. Remedies
Several cases decided during the Survey year considered the avail-
ability of backpay orders against labor organizations. Section 10(c) of
the NLRA provides in part: "[Black pay may be required of the .. .
labor organization ... responsible for the discrimination : . ." 1 Gener-
ally, backpay orders have only issued against unions violating section
8(h) (2). 2 In National Cash Register Co. v. NLRB,' the Sixth Circuit
upheld a Board order requiring a union to pay lost wages to employees
even though the union had not violated section 8(b) (2), thus expand-
ing the availability of such orders. Subsequently, however, the Board
refused to depart from a long-standing rule, and it denied a backpay
order against a union where the union's unfair labor practices inter-
fered with the employees' ingress to the plant—resulting in lost wages
—but did not constitute interference with the tenure or terms of their
employment status'
In National Cash Register, the union had violated section 8(b)
(1) (A) 5 by conditioning the right of employees—union members and
non-members alike—to obtain a pass to cross a picket line on the pay-
ment of a wage contribution to the union. The employer was also found
to have violated section 8(a)(1)° by enforcing the unlawful pass re-
quirement because it feared for the safety of employees attempting to
cross the picket line without a pass. Because the employer had en-
forced the pass requirement in the absence of a specific union request,
the union was not found to have violated section 8(b) (2). The Board's
order made the employer and union jointly and severally liable for the
backpay of employees who missed work because they refused to
comply with the unlawful contribution requirement.' On appeal the
union argued that a backpay order was inappropriate in these circum-
stances under the Board's Colonial Hardware rule,8
 which precludes
the issuance of a backpay order when the union has interfered with
1 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
2 See Note, A Survey of Labor Remedies, 54 Va. L. Rev. 38, 73 (1968). Sec gener-
ally Fuchs & Kelleher, The Back-Pay Remedy of the National Labor Relations Board,
9 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 827 (1968). 29 U.S.C. § 158(6)(2) (1970) makes it an un-
fair labor practice for a union to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee.
a 466 F.2d 945, 81 L,R.R,M. 2001 (6th Cir. 1972).
4 Teamsters Local 901 (Lock Joint Pipe & Co.), 202 N.L.R.B. No. 43, 82 L.R.R.M.
1525 (1973).
5 29 U.S.C.	 158(b) (1) (A) (1970) makes it an unfair labor practice for a union
to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of § 7 rights.
0 29 U.S.C.	 158(a)(1) (1970) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of § 7 rights.
7 National Cash Register Co., 190 N.L.R.B. No. 117, 77 L.R.R.M. 1342 (1971).
8 Furniture Workers Local 472 (Colonial Hardware Flooring Co.), 84 N.L.R.B.
563, 24 L.R.R.M. 1302 (1949).
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the employees' ingress to his job site but has not caused a termination
or disruption of his employment status. The Board viewed Colonial
Hardware as inapplicable since it was, in fact, the union's coercion
that caused the employer to discriminate against employees unable to
obtain passes because of their refusal to comply with the unlawful
contribution requirement. Noting the Board's broad discretion in fash-
ioning remedies under section 10(c), the Sixth Circuit agreed with the
Board that the union had been "in a real sense" responsible for the
discrimination, and upheld the backpay order even though there was
no section 8(b) violation.° At the Board's request, the court adhered
to the distinction drawn by the Colonial Hardware rule and refused
backpay orders for wages lost before the employer affirmatively en-
forced the pass requirement."
National Cash Register, then, establishes that a backpay order
against a union is appropriate in cases where there is employer dis-
crimination caused by a union which interferes with the employment
status of employees. It expands the availability of backpay orders
against unions by recognizing that unions have alternate means, equal
in potency to use of a specific request or warning, for gaining employer
complicity in requiring employees to comply with an unlawful condi-
tion for employment. However, National Cash Register leaves un-
changed the Colonial Hardware rule. That rule was originally predi-
cated upon a belief that the Board lacked authority to issue backpay
orders under section 10(c) in the absence of a showing that the union
was responsible for discrimination against an employee that interfered
with the employment status of the employee. The theory behind the
rule is that an award for interference with ingress to the plant would
constitute damages for that interference as contrasted with compen-
sation for interference with the employment status." The validity of
the rule has not been passed upon; 12 however, its validity is question-
able in light of the Board's broad discretion to adopt remedies which
will effectuate the policies of the Act and remove the effects of unfair
labor practices," and the Board itself applies the rule as a "matter of
policy!'"
Nevertheless, during the Survey year the Board, in a split de-
cision, adhered to Colonial HaruKtre and refused to grant backpay to
0 466 F.2d at 965-66, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2014-15.
To Id. at 967, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2015.
11 84 N.L.R.B. at 565-66, 24 L.R.R.M. at 1306.
12 See, e.g., UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 641 n.5 (1958).
18 The court in National Cash Register questioned the validity of the rule, suggest-
ing that it is inconsistent with the policy of insulating employees' jobs from their or-
ganizational rights. 466 F.2d at 965 n.20, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2014 n.20.
14 Operating Engineers Local 513 (Long Construction Co.), 145 N.L.R.B. 554, 54
L.R.R.M. 1429 (1963).
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employees for wages lost when they missed work because they were
fearful for their safety due to picket line violence. In Lock Joint Pipe
& Co. , 16
 the union was found to have violated section 8(b) (1) (A) by
engaging in picket line misconduct, including threats of physical in-
jury to non-striking employees. The administrative law judge recom-
mended that the union be required to pay lost wages to employees who
missed work because of the union unfair labor practices. The Board
refused to issue a backpay order, characterizing it as contrary to prece-
dent under these circumstances. It adhered to the Colonial Hardware
rule, emphasizing that it considered backpay orders inappropriate in
the absence of interference with employment status, because of the
existence of adequate remedies to prevent picket line violence and be-
cause of its belief that the availability and utilization of backpay or-
ders against unions for picket line misconduct would result in the
diminution of the right to strike. ° Members Miller and Kennedy dis-
sented. They saw no basis for the majority's fear that backpay orders
would impede the right to strike. They focused on the remedial nature
of backpay orders, emphasizing their role in removing the effects of
the union's unlawful conduct."
The artificiality of the Colonial Hardware distinction between
interference with employment status and interference with the right
of ingress is illustrated by comparing Lock Joint Pipe with Stuart
Wilson, Inc., 18 also decided in the Survey year. In Stuart Wilson the
union violated section 8(b) (1) (A) by threatening non-strikers with
violence and section 8(b) (2) by warning the employer's president of
the danger to non-striking workers. The employer's president sent the
non-strikers home because he feared for their safety. A backpay order
was issued.° In Lock Joint Pipe, the majority distinguished Stuart
Wilson on the basis that the employer in Stuart Wilson discriminated
against the employees by sending them home. 2°
National Cash Register establishes that in Stuart Wilson a back-
pay order would have been appropriate even if the union had not
warned the employer of the danger to non-strikers. All that is required
for a backpay order is employer action in response to union pressure.
Thus, had the employer in Lock Joint Pipe, influenced by union mis-
conduct and out of fear for the safety of his employees, advised them
not to report to work, they would have received compensation for lost
15 Teamsters Local 901 (Lock Joint Pipe & Co.), 202 N,L.R.B. No. 43, 82 L.R.R.M.
1525 (1973).
10 82 L.R.R.M. at 1527-28.
17 Id. at 1529 (dissenting opinion).
15 Teamsters Local 212 (Stuart Wilson, Inc.), 200 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 82 L.R.R.M.
1165 (1972).
19 82 L.R.R.M. at 1165.
20 82 L.R.R.M. at 1528 n.4.
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wages. However, under National Cash Register an employer who sends
his employees home solely out of concern for their safety violates sec-
tion 8(a) (I) and may be held jointly and severally liable with the
union for lost wages. That court reasoned that such a paternalistic
approach—whereby the employer decides for its employees how best
to exercise section 7 rights—offends the philosophy embodied in the
language of section 7. 21
 In the face of such potential liability it is un-
likely that even the most concerned employers will advise threatened
employees to remain home. It is submitted that the Board should
reconsider the rule of Colonial Haidware. The employees in Lock Joint
Pipe lost wages because of union unfair labor practices, and in order
to remove the effects of those unfair labor practices, a backpay order
was necessary. 22
 Ironically, under the Colonial Hardware rule employ-
ees are in a better position if their section 7 rights are violated by their
employer as well as by the union.
VI. STRIKE VIOLENCE AND THE HOBBS ACT: Enmons
The Survey year saw the Supreme Court severely restrict the ap-
plicability to labor relations of the Hobbs Act,' which makes it a fed-
eral crime to obstruct interstate commerce by robbery or extortion. In
United States v. Enmon,s 2
 the Court held that the Hobbs Act does not
apply to the use of force or violence to achieve legitimate labor objec-
tives.
The defendants indicted under the Hobbs Act in Enmons were
members and officials of labor unions who were charged with con-
spiracy to obstruct commerce by using violence against the plant
facilities of an employer to obtain higher wages and other benefits for
striking employees. The District Court for the Eastern District of
21 466 F.2d at 963-64, 81 L.R.R.M. at 2013.
22
 The Supreme Court has limited in only one respect the Board's discretion under
§ 10(c) in fashioning remedies:
The power to command affirmative action is remedial, not punitive, and is to be
exercised in aid of the Board's authority to restrain violations and as a means
of removing or avoiding the consequences of violation where those consequences
are of a kind to thwart the purposes of the Act.
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 236 (1938).
1 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970). The Hobbs Act provides, in pertinent part:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or
the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extor-
tion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence
to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything
in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than twenty years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1970).
2 - U.S.	 93 S. Ct. 1007 (1973). For a detailed discussion of Enmons, see Note,
14 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. — ( 1973).
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Louisiana dismissed the indictment. 8
 The district court noted that the
Hobbs Act defined the term " 'extortion'" as " 'the obtaining of prop-
erty from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual
or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.' " 4
The court concluded that "neither the wages of bona-fide employees
nor the 'right to negotiate employment contracts—without illegal dis-
ruption' constitute 'property' as contemplated by the Hobbs Act.'
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court in a six-to-three
decision. The Court majority based its decision on four grounds. First,
using traditional methods of statutory interpretation,° the Court noted
that the use of the term "wrongful" in the statute's definition of extor-
tion would become redundant unless the term was utilized to limit "the
statute's coverage to those instances where the obtaining of the prop-
erty would itself be 'wrongful' because the alleged extortionist has no
lawful claim to that property." 7 Since the obtaining of higher wages
was a legitimate rather than "wrongful" union objective, the defen-
dants' actions were not covered by the Hobbs Act. 8 The majority also
found support for their conclusion in the statute's legislative history°
and in the absence of any prior cases in the decades since its enact-
ment in which the Hobbs Act was applied to activity in furtherance of
a legitimate labor objective."
The Court's final basis for its decision involved its concern over
extension of the statute to "cover all overtly coercive conduct in the
course of an economic strike . . . ."" This could produce the result
that "[t]he worker who threw a punch on a picket line, or the striker
who deflated the tires on his employer's truck would be subject to a
Hobbs Act prosecution and the possibility of 20 years' imprisonment
and a $10,000 fine."" The Court noted that as a criminal statute the
Hobbs Act should be strictly construed and that more explicit language
than that contained in the statute would be required for the "unprece-
dented incursion into the criminal jurisdiction of the States" of putting
"the Federal Government in the business of policing the orderly con-
duct of strikes.""
Justice Douglas, in dissent, took an opposite view of the legislative
8 United States v. Enmons, 335 F. Supp. 641, 79 L.R.R.M. 2074 (1971) .
4 Id. at 643, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2075, quoting 18 U.S.C. 	 1951(b) (1970).
a 335 F. Supp. at 646, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2077.
a See 2 J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 4705 (3d ed. 1943).
7 93 S. Ct. at 1009-10.
8 Id. at 1010.
9 Id. at 1010-14.
10 Id. at 1014.
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history and stated that "using violence to obtain . . . {higher wages]
seems plainly within the scope of 'extortion' as used in the Act, just as
is the use of violence to exact payment for no work or the use of
violence to get a sham substitution for no work.'"4 Justice Douglas also
apparently felt that, to avoid the "incursion" into state jurisdiction
feared by the majority, the statute should be construed so as not to
apply to "low-level acts of violence" resulting from bona fide collective
bargaining."
The effect of Enmons on lawful economic strikes is clear, since it
completely precludes the use of the Hobbs Act to suppress violent
conduct resulting from such strikes. However, the Court did not define
the scope of the "legitimate union objectives" which bar application
of the statute." The Court did indicate that a union's desire for
" 'wage' payments from employers in return for 'imposed, unwanted,





14 Id. at 1018 (dissenting opinion).
15 Id. at 1019 n.17 (dissenting opinion).
10 Id. at 1010.
17 Id., citing United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415 (1956) and United States v.
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